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Abstract
Over the last two decades, the degree of international financial integration has increased substan-
tially, becoming an important area of research for many financial economists. This paper explores
the determinants of the asymmetries in the international integration of banking systems. We consider
an approach based on both network analysis and the concept of geographic neutrality. Our analysis
focuses on the banking systems of 18 advanced economies from 1999 to 2005. Results indicate that
banking integration should be assessed from the perspective of both inflows and outflows, given that
they show different patterns for different countries. The parametric techniques point out the remark-
able role of both geographic distance and trade integration. However, the most relevant results are
yielded by nonparametric techniques, which we use due to the lack of well-established results on the
determinants of trade in assets. These techniques reveal that the effect of the covariates on banking
integration is not constant over the conditional distribution which (in practical terms) implies that
the sign of the relationship varies across countries.
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1. Introduction
Globalization can be defined as the increased integration of economies, reflected in international flows
of trade, capital, investment and migration. Trade in assets has been part of what is referred to as
international financial integration or what some authors have labeled as financial globalization. Although
it is generally accepted that there has been an expansion of the degree of international financial integration
over the last two decades, it is also generally agreed that financial globalization is primarily confined to
rich countries (Mishkin, 2007). As a result, this phenomenon has become an increasingly relevant issue and
a topical area of research for many economists. Certain initiatives such as the Financial Services Action
Plan (FSAP) to integrate European financial markets and the degree to which these have been achieved to
date have triggered off many studies (see, among many others Baele et al., 2004; European Central Bank,
2007; García-Herrero and Wooldridge, 2007; Berger et al., 2000; Portes et al., 2001; Portes and Rey, 2005;
Cabral et al., 2002; European Central Bank, 2007; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008).
In their recent study, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) use measures of integration such as the level of
foreign assets (liabilities) as a share of GDP. They observe that financial globalization is complex and
its reach varies across countries, highlighting the fact that developed economies play a more relevant
role in the process. While developed countries account for over 90% of the total outstanding foreign
liabilities, about 8% is attached to emerging countries and the rest to other developing countries. Some
other authors corroborate these findings (Kose et al., 2006; Moshirian, 2008), according to whom the
current data indicates that developed countries have been the most significant beneficiaries of financial
globalization, followed by some specific emerging countries.1 However, the empirical evaluation of financial
integration, together with its causes and consequences, is still limited. Some reasons for this relate to
the fact that the usual integration measures do not control for some relevant factors in the globalization
process, which is characterized not only by the growing degree of openness but also by a network of
interconnections that is becoming denser among economies (OECD, 2005; Arribas et al., 2008, 2009a,b).
Several recent studies consider that, despite the forces that represent a drastic reduction in barri-
ers to competition in the financial services industry (removal of barriers, deregulation, improvements in
information processing and telecommunications, etc.), some financial markets—particularly commercial
banking markets—currently remain far from globalized. In contrast, some others are quite integrated
(Baele et al., 2004), as corroborated by the velocity at which the current financial turmoil has spread
worldwide. The evidence suggests that borders and distance continue to play an important role in the
geography of financial flows, and that home bias is still relevant in the allocation of resources. In partic-
ular, many banking services remain local, probably as a consequence of competitive advantages that the
superior information of banks about local and non financial suppliers and customers represents (Berger,
2003; Berger and Smith, 2003; Berger et al., 2000, 2003).
However, the final assessment of the level of financial and banking integration hinges on the measures
considered. Previous studies may be classified into two groups: those using price-based measures, and
those using quantity-based measures. Studies falling into the former category are usually based on the
law of one price (LOOP), according to which in financially integrated markets, assets generating identical
returns should be priced identically, irrespective of where they are traded. However, these indicators may
suffer from both theoretical and empirical problems if assets are not homogeneous, especially for emerging
markets or developing economies where we perceive wide differentials in trust and confidence. In these
economies, returns on financial instruments may incorporate risk and liquidity premia that are difficult to
quantify and, in general, domestic financial markets might simply not be deep or liquid enough to allow for
efficient arbitrage of price differentials (Kose et al., 2006). In the particular case of banking on which we
focus, it is often impossible to verify whether the LOOP holds due to wide differences in banking products
and lack of data (Manna, 2004). In addition, since there is no volume equivalent to the LOOP, no single
test can be run on volume data which by itself allows us to verify the null hypothesis of integration.
Some studies, especially those based on quantities (see, for instance, Pérez et al., 2005), conclude
that even if the LOOP holds because trade and monetary barriers are levied, economic integration may
not be a natural phenomenon and people might still hold a disproportionate share of domestic assets, as
predicted by the home equity bias literature (Lewis, 1999). As surveyed by Gropp and Kashyap (2009),
this is a similar approach to that by Gual (2004), according to which retail bank flows in the European
Union are less than 1 percent of total lending. The generalization of the home bias problem is apparent
1Such data corroborates the analysis by Obstfeld and Taylor (2005) regarding the patterns of financial globalization both
in the 19th and then in the 20th century.
in the asymmetries observed for foreign financial investments which frequently show strong geographical
biases. Under these circumstances, it is important to set the “standards” prevailing when using quantity-
based indicators for measuring either financial or banking integration—as indicated above, there is no
quantity-based equivalent to the LOOP. When building these standards we will be particularly concerned
by the fact that, until very recently, quantity-based studies of financial and banking integration have dealt
mostly with openness, disregarding the fact that integration may also advance because countries are more
balanced in their relations with their financial partners—i.e., disregarding that financial links do actually
constitute a network. The new approaches based on network analysis (see, for instance Kali and Reyes,
2009) try to fix this, by uncovering the structure of the financial/banking networks that economies forge.
They are based on contemplating the flows between them as the vectors of a graph in which the nodes
represent the countries, and then the degree of connectedness in the network is analyzed (von Peter, 2007;
Kali and Reyes, 2009).2
Along with the literature on quantity-based and price-based indicators of banking integration, as re-
cently reviewed by Gropp and Kashyap (2009), there are other approaches to measure banking integration
such as Köhler (2009a,b), who use cross-border bank mergers. According to this approach, the absence of
cross-country bank mergers and acquisitions, in comparison to the number of domestic bank mergers, is
evidence against retail bank integration. Gropp and Kashyap (2009) have themselves proposed a recent
metric for bank integration based on Stigler (1963), who considers that integration presumes new entry
and that takeovers will lead to a convergence in profitability. Although both Köhler’s (2009a; 2009b)
and Gropp and Kashyap’s (2009) have some advantages over traditional measures of bank integration,
we consider there is still remarkable progress to be made using quantity-based indicators based on cross-
border bank retail flows’ information. Accordingly, our methods are more in line with those conceding
cross-border flows as evidence of bank integration.
Specifically, in this paper we measure bank integration by merging some of the ideas of the network
analysis literature with the concept of geographic neutrality (Krugman, 1996; Iapadre, 2006), which was
introduced in the seventies by Kunimoto (1977) but has barely attracted the attention of the literature
on economic integration. However, these ideas are relevant because they formalize the concept of the
global village. They also relate to the literature analyzing regionalism (and its effects on the intensity
of intra-regional and extra-regional trade), which considers the problem of prioritizing some connections
over others vs no-country, or no-regional, preference situation. Specifically, the concept of geographic
neutrality may be defined as the absence of preferential directions in flows: the geographic distribution of
a country’s trade is said to be neutral if the weight of every partner in the country’s trade is equal to its
weight in the world trade.3 Following similar ideas in the financial area, Manna (2004) develops statistical
indicators of the integration of the euro area banking system which estimate home bias and the distance
of the actual distribution of cross-border positions from the distribution prevailing under the assumption
of no-country preference.
These problems have also been dealt with when evaluating the differences between de jure and de facto
financial integration measures,4 which suggest that economic agents might be reluctant to go abroad be-
2The use of techniques of complex network analysis is not new in social sciences. See, for instance, the literature on
social networks, examples of which include Annen (2003), Hanneman and Riddle (2005), Wasserman and Faust (1992),
Wellman and Berkovitz (1988), or Rauch (2001). It is also gaining momentum in the international economics literature.
Different studies analyze the structure and dynamics of international trade, using instruments such as centrality, network
density, clustering, assortative mixing or maximum flow. The applications of these techniques to the study of the WTW
focus their interest on the topological properties of the world network, and the evolution of the degree of connectedness
among countries, the influence of the level of development on the position (central and peripheral) of the countries, and
the role of the regional connectedness in the globalization context (Kali and Reyes, 2007), and economic growth (Kali et al.,
2007; Fagiolo et al., 2007). Most of this literature values the importance of trade flows establishing a threshold (binary links)
(Kim and Shin, 2002; Garlaschelli and Loffredo, 2005). However, some recent works (Fagiolo et al., 2007, 2009) apply con-
cepts of weighted network analysis (Barrat et al., 2004; Barthélemy et al., 2005) and study the intensity of flows specifically.
They also look at if there is any symmetry in the relation between nodes in both directions (i.e., outflows and inflows), in
which case the importance of flow does not depend on the direction of flow itself. This is not the case with bank flows, where
the differences in direction turns out to be relevant.
3The situations of no-geographic preferences in flows would be an important reference in our analysis of the level of
financial integration. They can be considered equivalent to scenarios called “zero gravity” in some studies (for instance
Eaton and Kortum, 2002), because distance does not matter and/or remoteness does not exit. In these situations economies
would be perfectly integrated through a complex network of connections.
4The shortcomings of the jure measures of integration are related to a variety of facts such as: (i) they do not accurately
reflect the degree of openness of the capital account, since they are partially based on restrictions associated with foreign
exchange transactions, which may not necessarily impede capital flows; (ii) they do not capture the degree of enforcement of
capital controls (or the effectiveness of that enforcement), which can change over time even if the legal restrictions themselves
cause of the institutional barriers of source and destination countries (for instance, in terms of property
rights and law enforcement), or the influence of regulation (Papaioannou, 2009), or the available informa-
tion on foreign markets. Geographically neutral financial (or banking) flows would exist if a country B’s
share of A’s outflows is equal to B’s share of total world assets outside of A. Should we discard this fact,
our measures of international financial/banking integration would be biased because of not including the
potential asset trade diversion due to the changes in factors such as common currency, trade agreements,
or several types of distances between countries.
Our study aims to measure international banking integration and its determinants, between 1999 and
2005, using available data on bilateral asset trade for a set of 18 countries that represents more than 80%
of the world financial assets by 2005. We analyze bank outflows and inflows separately, which allows us to
identify significant differences between their determinants. The main methodological contribution is that
our integration indicators measure both the openness and the connectedness of the network which forms
bilateral banking flows between countries. Therefore, the level of integration will also take into account
the proportionality between financial flows among economies and their relative sizes. By acknowledging
the role of bilateral connections between economies, the geography of trade relations and the distance
between countries becomes central in the interpretation of integration.
The set of determinants has been chosen taking into account both previous literature on the subject
and the available data. Specifically, recent evidence has shown the importance of the links between
financial and trade integration, the influence financial development has on integration, the important role
a country’s social capital plays in attracting inflows, and the advantage (disadvantage) that a central
geographical location (peripheral) represents for countries
Unfortunately, as stated by Portes and Rey (2005), there are very few well-established results on the
determinants of trade in assets. The absence of a little theory underlying each investigation has resulted
in studies which are mostly exploratory in nature. This literature has received renewed attention, but
results vary a great deal because of the multiplicity of angles, such as the type of indicator used to measure
integration (prices or quantities), the type of financial data considered (banking data or other assets), the
coverage of the sample (global vs. regional comparisons), etc.
Under these circumstances, we consider it appropriate to evaluate how the selected covariates affect
banking integration using more flexible techniques that do not stipulate any specific functional form, and
which are more informative when the relationship between variables is harder to understand. Specifically,
we will consider some of the nonparametric methods considered in Henderson and Millimet (2008) (among
others) where a comparison between parametric and nonparametric methods in the context of the gravity
model of bilateral trade is performed. Our results indicate that it is appropriate to use these methods,
since the way the different covariates influence banking integration is involved, so we obtain a valuable
assessment of the success of parametric models relative to a completely flexible alternative.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we define the Standard of Perfect Banking Integration
(SPBI) and characterize the indicators of banking integration for each country and for global banking
markets as a whole. Section 3 presents the determinants of integration, and Section 4 illustrates the
empirical methodology. Section 5 and 6 are devoted to presenting the data and results, respectively.
Section 7 concludes.
2. International banking integration indicators
As indicated previously, we consider that banking globalization is a complex phenomenon and, as such,
indicators designed to measure it should attempt to uncover all aspects of this complexity, distinguishing
explicitly that openness and integration might not necessarily be the same thing. Therefore, the integration
of international banking markets starts with the cross-border banking flows, but its effects and scope also
depend on the structure of current relations between banking markets. Relevant aspects of this structure
include the number of countries each country is in contact with, whether the relationships are direct or
indirect (i.e., whether flows cross third economies), the volume of cross-border banking activity between
them, and the proportionality of this activity to the size of the banking markets.
We define the relative flow (banking assets or liabilities) or degree of banking openness of country
remain unchanged; (iii) these measures do not always reflect the actual degree of integration of an economy into international
capital markets (Kose et al., 2006).
i as
DBOi =
∑
j∈N\iXij
X̂i
(1)
where N is the set of countries, i and j typical members of this set, Xi is the volume of banking assets in
county i, Xij refers to the banking market activity between countries evaluated as either the cross-border
flows of assets or liabilities—i.e., the amount of bank assets of a given country that are owned by foreign
banks. We define ai as the country i’s relative weight with respect to the world banking markets, i.e.,
ai = Xi/
∑
j∈N Xj , then X̂i is the flow from country i to the world taking into account the weight in the
international banking systems of the country under analysis, namely, X̂i = Xi − aiXi.
The degree of banking openness yields non-negative results, where a value lower than 1 indicates that
its cross-border banking flows are lower than those corresponding given the country’s share of the world
banking assets. In contrast, a value higher than 1 indicates that country i’s cross-border banking flows
are higher than those corresponding given the country’s share of the world banking assets.
However, the international integration is not only a question of increasing the openness of countries
but also of developing a network of direct and indirect relations between banking markets. From a
globalization perspective the architecture of financial trade connections that each country has with the
rest of the world cannot be disregarded. Some recent studies which analyze financial globalization from
a network perspective have acknowledged how important it is to take into account that the immediate
borrower and the ultimate risk are not always the same, since financial or banking flows may reach their
final destination following indirect paths. Many trades follow these indirect paths by being conducted
through intermediaries in third countries, such as the financial centers of the UK and the Caribbean.5
When geographic barriers disappear, the effect of relative distance slowdowns and the shares of different
countries in the financial assets/liabilities of a country ought to be closer to the GDP’s shares. In an
extreme scenario of eradication of every possibility of remoteness, only the economic dimension of partners
will matter (Arribas et al., 2009b). These ideas are similar to those by the equity home bias literature,
according to which the proportion of foreign assets held by domestic investors is too small in relation to
the predictions of standard portfolio theory.
To analyze whether the connection of one country with others is proportional to the size in terms
of banking assets or liabilities, we define the degree of direct banking connection. This degree
measures the discrepancy between the direct cross-border banking flows in the real global banking system
and those corresponding to a global banking system where each country balances its relationships with
other individual countries in proportion to the size of their banking systems:
DDBCi =
∑
j∈N αijβij√∑
j∈N (αij)
2
√∑
j∈N (βij)
2
. (2)
where A = (αij) is the square matrix of relative flows, αij =
Xij∑
j∈N\i Xij
when i 6= j and αii = 0;
B = (βij) is the square matrix of degrees of openness in the perfectly balanced connected banking system,
βij =
Xj∑
k∈N\i Xk
with βii = 0. This can be defined as neutral financial trade; therefore, it is the financial
counterpart to the concept of geographic neutrality.
To control for the indirect relationships between countries, let us define γi ∈ (0, 1) as the proportion of
flow that country i receives from another country to be invested in the first country. The amount of these
relationships may be remarkable if we take into account that many trades are conducted through interme-
diaries in third countries, such as the financial centers of the UK and the Caribbean (Warnock and Cleaver,
2003). In this case, the transactor country would not be the same as the country in which the security’s
issuer, ultimate purchaser, or seller is resident. Under the assumption that this proportion is equal to
the proportion of financial flows of country i that remains as home financial investment, we can estimate
γi = Xii/Xi. Then, let Γ be the square diagonal matrix of direct flow proportions, so that the element ii
of Γ is γi and the element ij, for i 6= j, is zero. The matrix of total flows from one country to another is
5As indicated by Warnock and Cleaver (2003), if a French resident purchases a US bond through a London-based broker,
US capital flows data would show an inflow from the UK which means that, in practice, in US data, a disproportionate
amount of purchases and sales of securities are attributed to residents of financial centers. Warnock and Cleaver (2003) refer
to this as a geographical mismatch in the capital flows data.
the sum of the direct and indirect flows and can be estimated as
AΓ =
∞∑
n=1
Γ(I − Γ)n−1An, (3)
BΓ =
∞∑
n=1
Γ(I − Γ)n−1Bn (4)
where I is the identity matrix. Let αΓij be the element ij of the matrix A
Γ and βΓij be the element ij of
the matrix BΓ.
We define the degree of total banking connection:
DTBCΓi =
∑
j∈N α
Γ
ijβ
Γ
ij√∑
j∈N
(
αΓij
)2√∑
j∈N
(
βΓij
)2 . (5)
The degree of total banking connections ranges in the (0, 1) interval, and it measures the distance of
the direct and indirect banking flows of a country from what its banking flows would be in a perfectly
connected world. It should be close to 1 when the banking flows of a country are proportional to the size
of the receiver countries (indirect international neutrality) and close to zero if the largest countries do not
receive any banking services and the smallest receive all of them.
The degree of banking integration combines degrees of financial openness and total connection,
provided that both set limits to the integration level achieved.
DBIΓi =
√
min{1/DBOi, DBOi}·DDBCΓi (6)
The degree of integration of a country is the geometric average of its deviation from the balanced
degree of openness and regularity by total connections.6
These indexes can be computed for both assets or liabilities depending on whether Xij refers to flows
of assets between countries or to flows of liabilities. We will use the super-index out or in respectively to
distinguish among them. Hence, the indexesDBOout, DBOin, DBIout andDBIout have been computed.7
We can finally consider global indicators, controlling for each country’s share of international banking
assets. Specifically, the degree of global banking openness would be defined as
DGBO =
∑
i∈N
aiDBOi, (7)
the degree of global direct banking connection would be defined as:
DGDBC =
∑
i∈N
aiDDBCi, (8)
and the degree of global banking integration would be defined as:
DGBI =
∑
i∈N
aiDGBIi, (9)
where ai = Xi/
∑
j∈N Xj. Following Frankel (2000), the degree of global banking integration could be
interpreted as a Standard of Perfect Banking Integration.
6We provide results only for direct relationships for space reasons. They are available for the interested reader upon
request.
7The indicators presented here have certain disadvantages, which are less stringent in other contexts. Specifically, if our
indicators were applied to trade in goods (see Arribas et al., 2009b), the available sample would be in general much larger,
which is a clear advantage, especially when financial flows with out-of-sample countries are high. In addition, measuring the
degree of banking integration carries additional disadvantages such as the need to decide on whether to use consolidated or
non-consolidated banking data, which may differ remarkably for some banks.
3. On the determinants of international financial integration
Previous initiatives analyzing the determinants of cross-border asset holdings have considered a wide
range of covariates. Unfortunately, as indicated by Portes and Rey (2005), there are very few well-
established results on what the most relevant drivers of international trade in assets are.8 One of them, by
Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007), found that trade in goods and trade in assets are closely related. Another
key finding is that by Portes and Rey (2005), who noticed that market size, efficiency of the transac-
tions technology, and distance are the most important determinants of transaction flows. These stud-
ies, while being important, cannot be directly compared to ours, given that they use bilateral data in
their regressions. This enables their authors to use some interesting information such as—in the case
of Portes and Rey (2005)—the distance between each country pair, the volume of telephone call traffic,
the number of branches in country j of banks headquartered in country i, the number of trading hours
overlap between the main financial centers of each country pair, or the covariance of stock market returns.
Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) extend these covariates by also considering whether each country pair shares
the language and their legal systems, whether there is a colonial link, or bilateral tax treaties, among oth-
ers. Most of these variables are relevant yet remain out of our reach because of their bilateral nature.
Therefore, although our indicators of financial integration have the virtue of being country-specific, this
advantage might become a disadvantage when analyzing the determinants, since it impedes the usage of
some relevant bilateral information.
On the other hand, there are authors such as Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003, 2008) who use country-
specific information for analyzing the determinants of foreign assets and liabilities. Accordingly, their set
of covariates differs when compared to the studies by Portes and Rey (2005), and Aviat and Coeurdacier
(2007). But there are also several important coincidences and findings such as the relevance of trade
openness and financial development.9 Therefore, our set of drivers of financial globalization are rooted in
the literature, taking into account both types of studies—those focusing on bilateral data and those using
unilateral data.
Our first driver of financial integration is trade openness, which follows the above cited studies by
Portes and Rey (2005), Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007), and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003, 2008). Al-
though the way through which trade influences financial flows remains unclear (see Aviat and Coeurdacier,
2007, for a detailed analysis), the sign of the relationship is generally found to be positive. Some results
suggest that trade in goods directly results in corresponding financial transactions such as, for instance,
trade credit, transportation costs, or export insurance (Vo and Daly, 2007). Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000)
indicate the gains to international financial diversification and the extent of goods trade are strongly
related because of the wedge created by trade costs between marginal rates of substitution, curbing the
gains to asset trade. In addition, Foreign Direct Investment often makes financial positions and trade
in goods to be jointly determined. Finally, some authors such as Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) sug-
gest that openness in goods markets might create an increased disposition for asset trade (the so-called
“familiarity effect”), reducing home bias. These studies measure trade openness via standard measures
such as total trade to GDP, and related. Alternatively, we propose using trade indicators analogous to
the banking integration indicators introduced in Section 2. Hence, the degree of trade openness (DTO)
would be equivalent to the degree of banking openness (DBO), the degree of direct trade connection
(DDTC) would be equivalent to the degree of direct banking connection (DDBC), and the degree of
trade integration (DTI) would be equivalent to the degree of banking integration (DFI). All definitions
are analogous, the few differences relating to the nature of the flows (data on trade in goods instead of
trade in assets), and the fact that GDP is used instead of the size of the financial sector. Therefore, the
DTO follows the usual definition found in the literature but corrected for home bias—in order to take
into account that larger countries trade less (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997). The DDTC measures the gap
between the real trade flows and those in which countries export proportionally to the size of the recip-
ient economy (corresponding to a “perfectly” trade integrated world, in terms of Krugman’s geographic
neutrality concept).
Portes and Rey (2005) and Portes et al. (2001) have shown that physical distance, as a proxy for
informational costs, has a strong negative effect on assets’ trade flows, even when other informational
proxies are considered. The difference in the information that agents have and manage about financial
8In the particular case of banking on which we focus, the number of studies analyzing the determinants is much scarcer.
9The set of covariates used in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) differs from that used in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008)
because the former study focused on advanced economies only, whereas the latter extended the analysis to developing
countries.
markets generates the so called “home bias puzzle”, also reported by the literature on home equity bias
(Lewis, 1999): the proportion of foreign assets held by domestic investors is too small relative to the
predictions of standard portfolio theory. Some studies such as Kang and Stulz (1997) have found expla-
nations for the asymmetric information that domestic and foreign investors manage, while others such as
French and Poterba (1991) talk about the already mentioned “familiarity” effect. Home bias has declined
significantly in the last decade but important deviations from full diversification still exist. In the partic-
ular case of foreign bank assets with which we are dealing, Buch (2005) has also found that banks hold
significantly lower assets in distant markets, and that the importance of distance for the foreign asset
holdings of banks has not changed. According to her, explanations may relate to the fact that information
costs are of similar importance in banking as in other financial markets—following an interpretation of
distance in terms of information costs. The rationale is straightforward: if banks lend customers infor-
mation which is difficult to obtain and cannot raise bond or equity finance, we should expect enhanced
responsiveness of banking assets to distance.10 In addition, as suggested by Manna (2004), geographic
proximity and language sharing provide a rationale for a home bias in banking retail products.
Given that our cross-border financial measures are country-specific, it is not possible to include the
bilateral distance between each country pair i and j. Instead, we use a remoteness index (REMOTE),
which measures the distance between each i country and the rest of the world. It has been constructed
following the proposal by Nitsch (2000) and Deardorff (1998), who indicated that the relative distances
of trading partners have an impact on the volume of trade and, consequently, remote countries such as
Australia and New Zealand can be expected to trade more with each other.11 The hypothesized sign is
that remoteness should not be a priori relevant for cross-border asset trade, since transportation costs
for financial assets are zero. However, as found by Portes et al. (2001), distance does indeed matter for
cross-border asset trade and, consequently, the expected sign should be negative.
Recently, there has been extensive research effort put into answering the question as to whether differ-
ences in beliefs and preferences vary systematically across groups of individuals over time, and whether
these differences explain discrepancies in outcomes. As indicated by Ekinci et al. (2008), in some cultures
banks are not trusted and cash (or precious metals) is the only accepted store of value. Such savings
vehicles are not optimal for financial intermediation and, thus, financial or banking integration. In this
paper we consider the terms social capital and culture as synonyms, and assume trust and confidence
are important determinants of both. In these circumstances, since financial contracts are trust-intensive,
people are less likely to invest if they trust each other less and have no confidence in institutions, i.e., when
the level of social capital is low (Ekinci et al., 2008). Regarding financial exchange, Guiso et al. (2004)
found that not only the legal enforceability of contracts matters but also the extent to which the financier
trusts the financee. Therefore, we consider that the degree of financial openness and financial connection
may depend on social capital—which we measure following several approaches.12 Other authors that have
considered the influence of these types of variables on financial openness and financial integration are
Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007), or Papaioannou (2009). The former uses an index of corruption for both
the importer and exporter countries, since it is likely that hidden bribes reduce transactions in interna-
tional markets. The latter finds that foreign banks invest substantially more in countries with uncorrupt
bureaucracies, high-quality legal system, and a non-government controlled banking system. These types
of effects have also been analyzed by Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), who find that corruption and
imperfect contract enforcement reduce international trade dramatically.
Some authors such as Ekinci et al. (2008) use the trust and confidence variables provided by the World
Values Survey to proxy for social capital. The trust variable reports whether respondents agree with the
statements “most people can be trusted” and “I trust other people in the country”. The confidence variable
reports whether respondents agree to have confidence in the courts, parliament, and other institutions.
Unfortunately, both variables have no time dimension. Alternatively, a related variable that is becoming
increasingly used in the literature is the index constructed by the Heritage Foundation, which merges
information on regulation, trade, taxation, government, monetary, investment, financial, property rights,
and corruption (see, for instance Laeven and Majnoni, 2005). Appendix A provides a precise definition
of the variable.
We also consider the financial development-related variables included in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003,
10See Table 1 in Buch (2005) for a nice survey on studies relating distance and bilateral trade—both in goods and assets.
11Full details on the covariates used are provided in Appendix A.
12However, we must also admit that, as indicated by Fukuyama (2002), there is no agreement on what social capital is,
which he defines as cooperation among people for common ends on the basis of shared informal norms and values.
2008) and, in general, the literature on the drivers of financial integration. As indicated by Vo and Daly
(2007), well developed financial markets may attract foreign investors seeking to diversify their portfolios.
Some authors such as Henry (2000a,b) have corroborated these claims, finding that financial market de-
velopment impacts strongly on investment and international financial integration. Others have found that
market size, transactions costs and informational frictions influence the magnitude of gross cross-border
capital flows (Portes and Rey, 2005). The approaches vary from study to study. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2008) consider a single variable for measuring the level of financial development, made up by the sum
of stock market capitalization and bank deposits as a share of GDP. Since both components of financial
development are available (MKTCAP and DEPOSITS), we will consider their impact on financial inte-
gration individually. Some other studies such as Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) have also considered these
variables separately.13 Another financial development variable refers to the number and size of the stock
exchanges in each country. This information is included in the analysis using two additional variables,
namely, FIN10 (the number of each country’s financial centers among the top ten world financial centers)
and FIN1050 (the number of each country’s financial centers among the top 50 world financial centers,
excluding those included in FIN10).14 However, disentangling the importance of financial centers in asset
trade is hampered when we consider the fact that if a German resident purchases a US bond through a
broker in London, US capital flows will show an inflow from the UK as indicated by Warnock and Cleaver
(2003), this means in practice that, in US data, a disproportionate amount of securities’ trade is attributed
to residents of financial centres.15 Finally, we also consider the EURO dummy, taking the value of 1 for
euro-area countries. Full details of all variables are provided in Appendix A.
We include some variables to control for macroeconomic conditions in the country under analysis.
First, we consider the per capita income level in each country (GDPPC), which has been employed by
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003, 2008). Other previous studies have used this variable on the grounds
that countries which are rich and well educated tend to be highly integrated (Edison et al., 2002). Sec-
ond, we consider the consumer price index change in each country (CPICH) (Papaioannou, 2009).
Lemmen and Eijffinger (1996) have also found that inflation rates significantly explain international fi-
nancial integration within the European Union. Some authors such as Vo and Daly (2007) argue that
inflation might serve as a proxy for economic instability and therefore lead to a domestic currency de-
preciation which deterred foreign investors. However, the validity of this argument would be thwarted
if high inflation countries were members of a currency union—which is the case for most countries in
our sample. Unfortunately, there are some econometric problems when introducing jointly some of these
variables because correlation among them (especially GDPPC and CPICH) is high.
Finally, we have explored (but do not report) the impact of some other potential determinants such
as the efficiency of the banking systems. It could be the case that inefficient banking systems encourage
the entry of foreign banks from efficient banking systems. However, this variable was insignificant and
did not alter the other results.
4. Empirical methodology
4.1. Parametric and nonparametric models
The alleged absence of well-established theories on the determinants of international financial integration
constitutes an important difficulty for both selecting the relevant covariates and, more importantly, for
specifying which the correct functional form might be. Indeed, some authors consider this can only
be an exploratory exercise “given the lack of firm theoretical priors and the sparse prior literature”
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2003). Therefore, not only Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) but also other stud-
ies such as Vo and Daly (2007), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) or Pérez et al. (2005) generally consider
linear models and use least squares for the estimations, with varying levels of complexity. These are
parametric methods stipulating functional forms on the nature of the relationship between financial inte-
gration and its set of determinants. However, although linearity is usually imposed, this assumption does
not always hold, constituting a certain arbitrariness.
13In particular, they consider STKCAP , which measures stock market capitalization, and FINDEPTH, which measures
the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP.
14Full details on the source of these variables are provided in Appendix A. There is a recent study (von Peter, 2007)
which, using network analysis, constructs indexes of financial centers. Unfortunately, the information provided is for year
2007 only and, consequently, we must use the data source referred to in Appendix A.
15Warnock and Cleaver (2003) refers to this as a geographical mismatch in the capital flows data.
Furthermore, even if the functional form were correctly specified, a potential source of bias comes
from the differential effects that the determinants might have on the tails of the distribution of financial
integration. In other words, the estimated parameters may vary across locations. Some authors suggest
that a more complete picture of covariate effects can be provided by estimating, for instance, a family of
conditional quantile regressions (Koenker, 2005, p.20). These questions can be important in our specific
setting in which, as documented by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), the magnitude of financial integration
is different when comparing countries with different characteristics in the sample—in their case, developed
and developing countries showed very disparate levels of financial integration. This could imply that,
indeed, the effect of the covariates on financial integration might not be constant over the conditional
distribution.16
Under these circumstances we consider not only parametric but also nonparametric regression models
which provide an interesting, more flexible, alternative to explore the determinants of financial integration.
By relaxing the functional form assumed by parametric models which is commonplace in the literature, it
will be possible to assess the magnitude of the bias they generate. In addition, multicollinearity problems,
which often plague the estimations on the determinants of financial integration, are strongly alleviated.
Finally, although we could use quantile regression to evaluate the impact of the independent variables
at different levels over the conditional distribution of financial integration, the nonparametric regression
techniques proposed in this paper allow us to estimate the coefficients at each decile of the distribution,
and thus accurately assess whether the estimated effects vary across locations.
The parametric model we stipulate for estimating how the different covariates affect the levels of
DFOout, DFOin, DFIout and DFOout is,
Yi = β0 +
V∑
j=1
βjZij + εi, i = 1, . . . , T (10)
where Yi represents each of the dependent variables (DFO
out, DFOin, DFIout and DFOout), Zi is a
vector of regressors that may be either continuous or categorical, V is the number of regressors, εi is a
mean zero additive error, i is the country, and T the total sample size.
The nonparametric counterpart to Equation (10) is based on the Li-Racine Generalized Kernel Esti-
mation (Racine and Li, 2004; Li and Racine, 2004), which considers a nonparametric regression model
Yi = m(Zi) + εi, i = 1, . . . , N (11)
where m(·) is the (unknown) functional form. There are several choices for the type of nonparametric
regression being used but, for simplicity, we use the local constant kernel estimator, originally proposed
by Nadaraya (1964) and Watson (1964). See Li and Racine (2007) for details.
Since regressors may be either continuous or discrete (although the EURO variable is the only purely
categorical variable in our study), we define Zi = (Z
c
i , Z
d
i ) where Z
c
i refers to the vector of continuous
regressors, and Zdi refers to the vector of dichotomous regressors. Therefore, the underlying data is fre-
quently a mix of categorical and continuous data that goes beyond the scope of traditional nonparametric
kernel methods—which presumes that the underlying data is continuous in nature. In this case, we should
consider “generalized product kernels” as those presented by Li and Racine (2007).
For the continuous variables case we can use, for instance, the second order Gaussian kernel, whose
expression is:
w(xc, Zci , h) =
1√
2pi
exp
{
− 1
2
(Zci − zc
h
)2}
, (12)
where h is the bandwidth, which is obtained using least squares cross validation, and the weights in-
tegrate to unity. As indicated by Hayfield and Racine (2008), bandwidth selection is a key aspect of
sound nonparametric and semiparametric kernel estimation, equivalent to model selection for parametric
approaches.
If the variable was discrete instead, then we must first distinguish the cases where the categorical
16Previous research on trade that has taken into account these questions includes Fratianni and Kang (2006), who found
that the trade elasticity with respect to distance varies depending on both the number of OECD countries in the i, j pair and
the religious composition of the trading partners; Eaton and Kortum (2002), who estimate a spline in distance, allowing the
marginal effect of distance to vary; or Rose (2000), who allows the impact of a currency union to vary according to income,
income per capita, distance, and other variables (see Henderson and Millimet, 2008).
data is “ordered” and those in which it is not. Defining as Sd the support of Zd, and using zds and Zdis
to denote the sth component of zd and Zdi (i = 1, . . . , T ), respectively,
17 we define a discrete univariate
kernel function for zds and Z
d
is ∈ {0, 1, . . . , cs − 1} as:
lu(Zdis, z
d
s , λs) =
{
1− λs if Zdis = zds
λs/(cs − 1) if Zdis 6= zds .
(13)
where λs is the bandwidth, which in this case is restricted to the range [0, (ds − 1)/ds].
As the bandwidth on a continuous regressor becomes large, the implication is that the variable is
irrelevant (since we are using local-constant least-squares). See Hall et al. (2007) and Li and Racine
(2007) for further details.
4.2. Comparing parametric and nonparametric models
Model selection can be improved using, for instance, the criteria suggested by Henderson and Millimet
(2008). The authors establish three possible ways, namely, the Hsiao et al. (2007) test, the Li (1996)
test based on the comparison of density functions, and evaluating the forecast accuracy. The methods
we propose follow closely their first two proposals. The null hypothesis of the Hsiao et al. (2007) test
stipulates that the parametric model is correctly specified (H0 : Pr[E(x|z) = f(z, β)] = 1), against the
alternative that it is not (H1 : Pr[E(x|z) = f(z, β)] < 1). Therefore, the focus is exclusively on the
parametric model.
Complementarily, we use a refined version of the Li (1996) test (Li, 1999) to assess the ability of
different models (in our case, parametric vs. nonparametric) to fit the observed data. In order to do this,
we formally test whether the predicted values from the parametric and nonparametric differ significantly
from the observed data. We can also test the predicted values from the parametric model against the
predictions of the nonparametric one. Therefore, if f and g were the distributions corresponding to, let
us say, the parametric model and the observed data, the null would be H0 : f(x) = g(x) against the
alternative, H1 : f(x) 6= g(x). The specific details of both tests can be found in Henderson and Millimet
(2008) and Hsiao et al. (2007).
5. Data
We use data from various sources. The dependent variables’ data is made up of the financial integration
indicator and its two components. Constructing them requires information on both total assets of the
different banking industries and foreign assets and liabilities of commercial banks. They include loans
and deposits, debt securities, other assets or liabilities (including equity participations), and claims and
liabilities vis-à-vis the monetary authorities (Buch, 2005). The data on total assets are provided by
the European Central Bank for European Union countries, and by the central bank of each remaining
country in the sample, with some exceptions. The data on bilateral banking financial assets and liabilities
are provided by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS),18 which issues quarterly the international
claims of its reporting banks on individual countries, geographically broken down by bank nationality. The
specific database on consolidated statistics contains foreign claims of banks headquartered in 30 major
financial centers. We consider the positions on an immediate borrower basis—defined as the country where
the guarantor of a claim resides. Data on an immediate borrower basis cover mainly claims reported
by domestic banks (those which have their head-office located in the reporting country), part of the
claims of inside area foreign banks (their cross-border claims on residents in their home country on a
non-consolidated basis), part of the claims of outside area foreign banks (their cross-border claims on
all other countries including their home country on a non-consolidated basis), and offices of inside area
foreign banks whose activities are not consolidated by their parent bank. Regarding the businesses to
be reported, these are made by on-balance sheet financial claims, among which all items representing
claims on other individual countries or economies should be included. The instruments include primarily
certificates of deposit (CDs), promissory notes and other negotiable paper issued by non-residents, banks’
holdings of international notes and coins, foreign trade-related credits, claims under sale and repurchase
17See the proposal by Aitchison and Aitken (1976) for unordered discrete variables.
18See http://www.bis.org/statistics/consstats.htm , section 9B, “Foreign claims by nationality of reporting banks,
immediate borrower basis. Historical series: by reporting country”.
agreements with non-residents, deposits and balances placed with banks, loans and advances to banks and
non-banks, holdings of securities and participations including equity holdings in unconsolidated banks or
non-bank subsidiaries.19
Information on covariates also comes from several sources. Some of them are provided by the CHELEM
data set.20 The trade integration covariates (DTO, DDTC, DTI) are constructed using information on
exports and GDP. Both exports and GDP are included in CHELEM, as well as population. Data on social
capital is gathered from the Index of Economic Freedom constructed by the Heritage Foundation. The
change in CPI (CPICH) is constructed from the IMF International Financial Statistics. BANK50 is
constructed yearly from Bankscope IBCA data. DEPOSITS is constructed from information provided
by central banks, whereas MKTCAP is provided by the World Bank (World Development Indicators).
Finally, FIN10 and FIN1050 have been constructed from information in The Global Financial Centers
Index report (Yeandle et al., 2008). All variables are measured in current US dollars with the exception
of per capita GDP, which is measured in constant US dollars. See Appendix A for full details.
The number of countries and years in the study is limited by the available information. The analysis
is made up of eighteen countries and seven years (1999–2005). Enlarging either the number of countries
or the length of the period involved loses some information in the other dimension, so we decided to keep
this reasonable balance in terms of countries and years. Although information on additional countries
was available for some years (Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Panama and Taiwan), the gains
in terms of total bank assets were not substantial, as the current sample accounts for more than 90% of
sample including the additional countries. We also use data from consolidated banks, in order to avoid the
problem of double counting, which may arise when using unconsolidated balance sheet data. In addition,
consolidated data are the only publicly available until now.
Table 1 reports some summary statistics. Of special note is the sharp decline in the share of interna-
tional bank assets by Japanese banks (from 21.25% in 1999 to 11.45% by 2005). It is also clear that the
US financial system is far less “bancarized” than European countries such as France, Germany, Italy or
Spain. Indeed, the total assets of the US banking system in terms or GDP are clearly the lowest in the
sample, both in 1999 and 2005. At the other extreme are Ireland and Switzerland, whose total assets in
terms of GDP by 2005 are 612.02% and 570.30%, respectively.
It is also apparent that, as indicated from columns seven through twelve, cross-border claims have
increased rapidly for all countries and they are now over 30 times larger in absolute terms than thirty
years ago (McGuire and Tarashev, 2006). These tendencies have taken place not only in absolute terms
(columns 11–12) but also as a percentage of GDP (columns 7–8), or as percentage of total assets (columns
9–10). The four last columns in Table 1 (columns 13–16) disclose information on how representative our
sample is compared to a hypothetical sample including all cross-border claims. The coverage varies from
country to country, and is not very high for some particular countries such as Austria or Greece but, on
average, is fairly high.
Table 1 contains information on outflows only, so as to save space and also because the information
on total consolidated foreign claims of the sample countries as a percentage either of their total foreign
claims or their total assets (i.e., the information reported by columns 13-16) is not available for inflows.
However, the results reported in the following sections are performed for both directions of foreign claims,
i.e., not only bank assets held abroad by banks of a given country (cross-border bank outflows), but also
on bank assets of each country owned by foreign banks (cross-border bank inflows). We will refer to each
direction using the out (outflows) and in (inflows) superscripts, to simplify the exposition of results.
6. Results
6.1. The integration of the international banking systems: general trends
Table 2 shows results on the degree of banking openness, degree of direct banking connection and degree
of banking integration for years 1999 and 2005. We notice that the most open banking systems (DBO) in
terms of assets held abroad by 2005 are those of Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium—the assets
held abroad by banks from these countries represent 81.9%, 75.6%, and 63.0% of their total assets. In
contrast, the Greek, Italian and US banking markets are far less internationalized, as shown by degrees
19Complete details are available through http://www.bis.org/statistics/consbankstatsguide.htm.
20Information on CHELEM (Comptes Harmonisés sur les Echanges et l’Economie Mondiale, or Harmonised Accounts on
Trade and The World Economy) database is available at URL http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/chelem.htm.
of financial openness of 5.3%, 8.4%, and 8.9% by 2005. In many instances cross-border banking flows
have increased sharply. For some countries they have almost doubled (Denmark), or even tripled (the
Netherlands and Sweden). Of special note is the case of some large European countries whose degrees of
openness increased a great deal. Patterns differ when considering the bank assets of each country owned
by foreign banks (inflows). Results vary especially for the most extreme cases. Some countries whose
DBOout is quite high (e.g., Switzerland) become much more closed in the case of inflows. The US is at
the opposite extreme. Disparity, though, is the general tendency: some countries now become much more
open—apart from the US, this is also the case of Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, or the UK—whereas
others become less financially open—Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden,
or Switzerland.
The degree of direct banking connection (DDBC) in Table 2 indicates whether cross-border bank
flows are balanced in terms of the banking systems size of both the sending and recipient countries.
According to the geographic neutrality idea, cross-border asset holdings of each country’s banks should be
directed preferably towards France, Germany, Japan, UK, or the US, whereas Denmark, Finland, Greece
or Portugal should attract less cross-border flows (in absolute terms). Some of the countries with lower
levels of DDBCout are the Nordic countries in our sample. These are countries with strong economic
and financial ties, suggesting that the incentives of economic agents to go abroad might be geographically
biased by these already established links. The only non-Nordic country withDDBCout < 60% as of 2005 is
Canada, which shares a common characteristic with these three countries, namely, the existence of strong
links with its neighbor (the US, in spite of the border effect; see McCallum, 1995). In this case, although
the size of the US banking markets is big, it might be attracting too much of Canada’s cross-border bank
asset holdings—i.e., the cross-border flows are not balanced. There are also some countries whose DDBC
does not overhang for being either too high or too low, which is the case of Ireland. However, Ireland’s
DDBC exhibits the highest growth between 1999 and 2005, reflecting the fact that its cross-border
financial flows have become more balanced, in terms of number and size of Ireland’s financial partners.
Whereas by 1999 the UK and the US accounted for more than 85% of Ireland’s foreign claims (54.9% and
31.5%, respectively), by 2005 some of its largest European partners account for higher shares of its foreign
assets. Specifically, the UK and the US have fallen in their relative importance (now representing only
42.2% and 10.3% of Irish foreign claims), whereas Germany, Italy, Spain and France account for 15.6%,
9.6%, 5.3% and 4.9%, respectively. This implies that, as suggested by the definition of the degree of
regularity of financial connections, Ireland’s cross-border flows are now more balanced. Explanations for
this pattern may be manifold, such as the adoption of the euro, which might have constituted an incentive
for Irish financial agents to go abroad and trade more intensely with euro area partners. Results vary if we
reverse the direction of the flows and examine each country’s assets owned by foreign banks (DDBCin).
According to the results, the Nordic countries are still at the bottom, i.e., they show geographic bias,
regardless of the directions of their financial flows, although some countries move upwards (Canada).
Results for the degree of financial integration (DBI) are also reported in Table 2. Information is split
according to the same criteria, namely, the direction of the flows, and the initial and final years. Since
DBIout (outflows) combines DBOout and DDBCout, its tendencies can be explained via the evolution
of its components. Disparities among countries are more pronounced in the case of the degree of banking
openness, whereas the DDBC values are more homogeneous. Thus, differences are determined mainly
by the degree of banking openness and, as such, the countries more financially integrated are Belgium,
the Netherlands, or Switzerland. However, although the more financially integrated countries in the
sample are small, large countries have also participated in this process: both Germany and France have
DBIout > 50% by 2005, and Japan, the UK or Spain also go beyond the 40% line. Extending the analysis
to the cross-border flows in the opposite direction, both Italy and in particular the US become much more
integrated.
The resulting scenario is that countries follow several paths to achieve their degrees of international
banking integration. Both openness and balance in the volume and direction of cross-border flows are
relevant. Its relevance, though, offers several perspectives: whereas openness generates marked differences
between countries, the degree of direct banking connection is more homogeneous, and higher. However,
this indicator also shows differences across countries and over time, suggesting a geographical bias exists
for the bilateral asset trading, as documented by previous literature. In addition, both domestic and
foreign banks contribute differently to the integration level of each country, the extreme and opposite
cases being represented by Switzerland and the US
Table 3 provides information on all global indicators—in which we consider the weight of the total
bank assets in each country. These indicators have been computed taking into account the weight of each
country’s banking system in the sample. Results indicate that, regardless of the direction of the asset
flows, the level of global integration attained as of 2005 is quite similar in terms of outflows or inflows
(45.4% and 46.6%, respectively). Therefore, although the pace is rapid (by 1999, the DGBI was mostly
below 40%), we are still not halfway to the theoretical full potential of international financial integration—
i.e., to the Standard of Perfect Financial Integration. The increase in DGBI has been mostly driven by
the increase in the degree of global financial openness, whose advance has been proportionally higher. In
contrast, the contribution of the DDBC has even been small for DDBCout and negative for DDBCin,
yet this finding was partly to be expected because the values of DDBC were already high by 1999.
6.2. Determinants of banking integration
Results on the determinants of banking openness (DBO) are displayed in tables 4 and 5, which consider
outflows and inflows, respectively. We run OLS regressions for the pooled data. The covariates enter the
model sequentially. Therefore, in column (1) of Table 4 only REMOTE is included in the regression,
which is both negative and significant, and explains close to 10% of variation in DBOout. Once other
variables are included in the model, the sign is negative throughout, although in some instances it is
not significant. Thus, it seems that distance and financial openness are negatively related, corroborating
previous results by Portes and Rey (2005) and Buch (2005), amongst others.
We add trade openness (DTO) to the set of regressors in columns (2)–(12), which improves the overall
explanatory power substantially—from 8.1% to 29.2% (adjusted R2). Its impact is positive and strongly
significant throughout. It is also the covariate with the strongest impact on DBOout.21 In contrast, our
other component of trade integration, the degree of direct trade connection (DDTC), which is added to
the specification in columns (3)-(12), is not significant. In addition, its contribution to the adjusted R2 is
negligible. This finding stands with previous results (see, for instance Aviat and Coeurdacier, 2007).
GDP per capita (GDPPC) is added to the specification in columns (4)–(12), contributing to a raise in
R¯2 from 30.5% to 41.6%. Its impact on DBOout is positive throughout, and significant in most instances.
The behavior of this variable is clearly influenced by the CPICH , since GDPPC’s significance declines
abruptly once CPICH enters the specification. The high (negative) correlation between GDPPC and
CPICH underlie this trend. However, we consider both variables are important determinants of financial
openness and, in addition, the multicollinearity tests performed indicated the problem was not particularly
severe. The CPICH variable is included in columns (8)–(12). Its impact is negative and highly significant
throughout, making the R¯2 increase from 59.0% to 65.4%.
The set of financial development regressors show mixed results. The ones used more intensely in the
literature, MKTCAP and DEPOSITS, which are added to the specification in columns (5)–(12) and
(6)–(12), respectively, are positive and significant throughout. Their contribution to the overall fit (R¯2)
is also remarkable, from 41.6% to 54.0% (in the case of MKTCAP ), and from 54.0% to 59.1% (in the
case of DEPOSITS). These results are also in line with previous results found by the literature. Both
covariates are relevant, yet the impact of MKTCAP is higher than that of DEPOSITS.22
In contrast, the impact of BANK50 (how many banks each country has among the top 50 banks in the
world) is mostly positive yet not significant. Its contribution to the R¯2 is virtually negligible. This result
could be emerging because of some opposed effects, since some countries such as the US show low DBOout
but have the highest share of large banks, and the opposite holds for countries such as the Netherlands
(with high DBOout and also a remarkable number of large banks).
FIN10 and FIN1050 enters with different signs in columns (9)–(12) and (10)–(12), respectively. Both
of them are significant throughout, and the contribution to the overall fit is non-negligible in both instances
(R¯2 increases from 65.4% to 71.0% in the case of FIN10, and to 76.3% in the case of FIN1050). The
overall impact on DBOout is also remarkable, as indicated by the standardized coefficients. The apparent
contradiction regarding the sign of the relationship is easy to explain when taking into account that, for
instance, Switzerland (the country with highest DBOout) is, together with the US, the country with the
highest number of financial centers (FIN10 = 2). However, it has no medium-sized financial centers
(FIN1050 = 0). In contrast, some other countries with a remarkable number of medium-sized financial
centers such as Canada, the UK and, especially, the US (all of them with FIN1050 = 3) do not particularly
excel in DBOout.
21This may be further corroborated via standardized coefficients, not reported here but available from the authors upon
request.
22This information is available by computing standardized coefficients—not reported for space reasons.
The last three regressors have been used by the literature to varying degrees. The HERITAGE
variable, included in columns (11)–(12), turns out to be unimportant in explaining variation in the level
of financial openness. The impact is negative yet insignificant in all instances. Therefore, the joint impact
of the HERITAGE components (namely, regulation, trade, fiscal, government, monetary, investment,
financial, property rights, corruption, and labor) is not relevant for explaining bank outflows. EURO is
included in the specification in columns (12), and is unimportant as well. In accordance with these results,
the R¯2 remains unaffected.
Table 5 provides the inflows’ counterpart to Table 4. This specific analysis for each direction of the
flows is important, since both the signs and significance of the regressors are remarkably altered. One
might expect that both the sign and significance of REMOTE should not change. That is, if distance
and DBOout are negatively related, distance and DBOin should be too. However, this is not the case,
since the variable is not significant in many instances and, in addition, the sign is reversed—the impact is
now positive. The explanation is provided by the behavior of some particular countries, given that some
of the most distant countries (the US, Greece and Finland) are also those with the highest DBOin (see
Table 2).23
When adding the trade variables to the specification in columns (2)–(12) (DTO) and (3)–(12) (DDBC),
results also vary markedly. The degree of trade openness (DTO) is not significant throughout and, in
some instances, the sign is even negative. Although this result looks a priori striking, we should take into
account that the DTO has been computed using exports only. Therefore, one might expect exports to go
hand in hand with financial outflows (DBOout), but not necessarily with financial inflows. This result is
also consistent with previous literature such as Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), who found that trade is
relevant for financial assets, yet not for financial liabilities. It could also be a priori difficult to explain
the highly significant and negative sign throughout DDTC. The magnitude of the impact is also high
(standardized coefficients). This result could also be explained by the behavior of some specific countries
such as Finland, Greece or the US, whose degrees of direct trade connection are low (for different reasons)
whereas their DBOin are high.
Both MKTCAP and DEPOSITS, which enter the specification in columns (4)–(12) and (5)–(13),
respectively, are now insignificant. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) also obtain a similar result, since they
find that the impact of financial development on financial assets is positive and significant, but not for
financial liabilities. Indeed, the only financial development significant variable throughout is FIN1050,
whose impact on DBOin is reversed with respect to that on DBOout—it is now positive. This could
suggest that these types of centers might be an important channel for domestic financing.
The sign of CPICH is also reversed, as one might a priori expect. This variable is included in
columns (8)–(12). Explanatory power rises sharply from 17.3% to 36.5%. Among the last two regressors
included in our model, EURO is not significant, as already found for DBOout. However, the impact of
HERITAGE is positive and highly significant, suggesting that when law enforcement is high (there are
also more guarantees that the contracts will be fulfilled), business opportunities abroad are attractive
and, therefore, cross border asset holdings become engaging. This variable also contributes to increasing
explanatory power (from 47.0% to 51.8%) but, compared with the model specified for DBOout, the fit is
much poorer (51.9% vs. 76.2%).
We have also performed estimations to explain the variations in DDBC and DBI (for both outflows
and inflows). However, for space reasons, we concentrate on DBI.24 These are reported in Table 6
(outflows) and Table 7 (inflows). In general, results corroborate those found for the DBO. The only
remarkable discrepancy relates to HERITAGE, whose impact on DBIout is now negative and significant
throughout. Explanations could be similar to those provided above for the DBO. If institutions are
trustworthy and law enforcement is high, business opportunities in the home country could be more
attractive than business opportunities abroad.
23In order to check the robustness of the results, we run the regressions excluding some potentially outlying observations
such as the US—especially in the case of inflows. In some cases, results were strongly affected. However, given the high
number of intrinsic behaviors, it is difficult to decide which countries to exclude from the analysis in order to perform the
robustness check. We consider that the nonparametric analysis fits this particular context better. In addition, including
extra estimations is problematic in terms of total paper length.
24Results on DDBC are available from the authors upon request.
6.3. Nonparametric analysis
Although the results above are undoubtedly interesting, some of the findings are difficult to reconcile.
For instance, the impact of remoteness on both financial openness and financial integration depends on
the direction of the flows. In the case of outflows, it is mostly negative and significant, yet in the case of
inflows it is mostly positive and non significant. This finding is difficult to justify, given that the impact
of distance should be a priori immune to the direction of flows.
A forensic view of both the data and previous results (see the initial paragraphs Section 6.1) reveals
that some individual countries are determining the nature of the relationship between REMOTE and
DBO and DBI. As indicated earlier, the US is a large economy distant from many other countries in
the sample. If the link between REMOTE and both DBO (or DBI) were negative for all countries,
we should expect low values for both DBO and DBI—at least when compared with many other sample
countries. However, although that is the case for the US outflows, it is not for the inflows, which are by
and large the highest. Under these circumstances, any parametric model will face difficulties in fitting the
data, because of their lack of flexibility—the so-called “parametric straitjacket”.
Figure 1 represents the nonparametric regression counterpart to Table 6, estimated using the methods
introduced in Section 4. They are not exact counterparts because the former displays results from uni-
variate nonparametric regression, whereas the latter shows results from multivariate parametric (OLS)
regressions. This implies that all other variables are held at their median values. We report results for
the DBIout variable only, for space reasons, although they have also been performed for the remaining
depending variables. In general, results yielded by OLS regressions are corroborated, but some important
subtleties are revealed by the nonparametric analysis. Table 6 shows that REMOTE and DTO have
strongly significant impacts on DBIout, with opposite signs. However, the nonparametric analysis reveals
that, in the case of REMOTE, the impact is strongly negative because of the bulk of observations that
lie in the vicinity of REMOTE = 0.05. This trend reverses for larger values of REMOTE, but then
significance decreases substantially, as revealed by wider error bands. Therefore, it seems that the mecha-
nisms operating are not the same for all sample countries. Regarding DTO, Figure 1 also shows that the
error bands widen up for larger values of the covariate (DTO > 0.4), whereas lower values corroborate
the high and positive sign found in Table 6.25
The remaining subfigures in Figure 1 generally corroborate the parametric results, but more informa-
tion is disclosed. The fuzzy trend of DDTC in Figure 1 matches both its non-significance and changeable
sign in Table 6. GDPPC impacts positively on DBIout, but it is mostly insignificant, although this
result might be corrupted by the high (negative) correlation among GDPPC and CPICH . Consistently,
Figure 1.d shows an upward trend of the regression line; however, the error bands are not wide enough to
conclude that the impact of the variable is not significant.
In general, financial development variables (MKTCAP , DEPOSITS and BANK50) coincide, and
reinforce the results reported in Table 6. Graphical results for FIN10 and FIN1050 are not displayed be-
cause of their “semi”-categorical nature. The impact of MKTCAP on DBIout is positive, but significance
is lost for high values of MKTCAP . The peculiar aspect of BANK50 regression line in Figure 1.g helps
to explain why parametric regressions yield non-significant coefficients, since the impact is positive for
BANK50 < 5, then it becomes negative, and finally (for BANK50 > 20) becomes positive again. There-
fore, underlying the non-significance found through OLS there could exist different mechanisms operating
for countries with varying levels of BANK50. The narrow error bands also suggest that the impact of
the variable is more significant that what the parametric analysis suggests. DEPOSITS enter the model
linearly, buttressing the signs yielded by the OLS regressions. Although a priori Figure 1.h suggests the
impact of CPICH on financial integration does not mimic the negative sign in Table 6, a deeper scrutiny
reveals that significance (narrower error bands) occurs mainly for the range of CPICH observations for
which a negative link with financial integration exists, whereas for other ranges of CPICH the link is
positive but with lower significance (wider error bands).
Finally, Figure 1.i indicates HERITAGE enters the analysis linearly. However, its impact on DBIout
is positive, contradicting the parametric analysis in Table 6, which show a strongly negative link. The
underlying explanation might relate to the fact that, as indicated above, Figure 1 displays univariate
counterparts to the multivariate results in Table 6. Should we run a separate univariate regression
DBIouti = β0 + β1HERITAGEi + εi, then the estimated coefficient is positive and highly significant,
25 Most of the nonparametric estimations in this article have been carried out using the np package by Hayfield and Racine
(2008), implemented in R.
suggesting the parametric model (12) might be misspecified.
Proper nonparametric counterparts to Model (12) in tables 6 and 7 are reported in tables 8 and 9.
Table 8 displays the mean nonparametric estimates of the determinants of financial integration, as well
as the coefficients at each decile of the distribution, considering both outflows and all covariates included
in model (12); Table 9 reports analogous information for inflows. Therefore, comparison between results
in tables 6 and 7 with those in tables 8 and 9 is direct.26 Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Both tables also provide the mean nonparametric estimates, in order to facilitate comparisons with the
parametric models. The densities of the gradients are reported in Figure 2.
Table 8 indicates that, when examining DBIout, the parametric estimate for REMOTE (−1.340, see
Table 6) is well above the corresponding mean (−0.0585) and 90th percentile (−0.3880) of the nonpara-
metric estimates. Thus, the nonparametric specification indicates that the parametric specification vastly
overstates the effect of REMOTE. This conclusion is drawn when analyzing mean values. However, the
effect varies depending on the decile of the distribution, since for larger values (above 60%) it becomes pos-
itive, corroborating the results found through the graphical analysis. The mean nonparametric estimate
of the degree of openness (0.0035) is also substantially lower than its parametric counterpart (0.403). The
positive impact exists for roughly 80% of the sample. The impact of some variables on DFIout is essen-
tially zero (DDTC, BANK50, CPICH and FIN10). The remaining variables (GDPPC, MKTCAP ,
HERITAGE and EURO) also impact DBIout with the same sign as the parametric model on aver-
age, since the coefficients at each decile of the distribution vary. For instance, GDP and MKTCAP
have a positive sign for the majority of the sample (around 70%), whereas in the case of FIN1050 and
HERITAGE the negative sign prevails for roughly 60% and 50%, respectively.
Table 9 provides the nonparametric counterpart to column (12) in Table 7. In contrast to the para-
metric estimate, the mean nonparametric estimate of REMOTE is negative, which is in accordance with
previous findings in the literature and is also consistent with the sign found for DBIout since, a priori, if
distance influences negatively asset trade this should be independent of the direction of the flows. How-
ever, this negative sign only prevails for roughly 40% of the sample, whereas for the remainder it is mainly
positive; therefore, the sign of the parametric model is strongly misleading, since it does not capture
the nonlinearities present in the data. The sign of DTO is coincidental for both mean parametric and
nonparametric estimates. However, it is negative for roughly 30% of the sample. In some cases the non-
parametric estimates are virtually zero, suggesting DEPOSITS, CPICH and FIN1050 could enter the
model linearly. For the remainder, we always find varying signs at the different deciles of the distribution,
suggesting the linear fit is off the mark. The bandwidths corresponding to the nonparametric regression
run are reported in Table 10. As indicated by Hall et al. (2007), since we are using local-constant least-
squares, the bandwidths on our continuous regressors tending towards infinity imply that the variable is
irrelevant (see also Li and Racine, 2007).
Therefore, results indicate that the added flexibility of nonparametric models allows disentangling some
of the relationships among the variables considered, which are intricate. In addition, we can formally test
whether the parametric model is indeed appropriate. The Hsiao et al. (2007) test provides means to do it,
and results are reported in Table 11. Results are striking given that, even for the most encompassing model
(model (12)), which includes all contemplated regressors, we always reject the null that this parametric
linear model is correctly specified. Although rejection is stronger for inflows (the JN value is higher in
virtually all instances), p-values lead in all cases to reject the null even at the 1‰ significance level.
The validity of the parametric approach is further analyzed in Table 12, which provides results on
the Li (1999) test, and its corresponding graphical counterpart in figures 3 through 6. Results are not
entirely coincidental with those provided by the Hsiao et al. (2007) test because the tests differ greatly—for
instance, the Li (1999) test is based on estimating density functions which require stipulating a bandwidth,
which we estimated using different methods for simplicity. When comparing the observed values with those
predicted by the parametric model (what in the Table is labeled as “Actual vs. predicted (parametric)”),
the null hypothesis of equality of distributions is always rejected at the 1% significance level for the inflows.
In the case of the outflows, the only cases in which it cannot be rejected are those models including the
majority of the regressors. Figures 3—6 display graphical counterparts to Table 12 for models (1), (4),
(8) and (12).27 Clearly, we visually corroborate that although results on the Li (1999) test indicate that
actual and parametric predictions do not differ significantly for model (12) in DBIout, Figure 5.d indicates
26We do not report information on DBO regressions for space reasons, although they are available from the authors upon
request.
27We only provide results for these models for space reasons.
differences do indeed exist.
In contrast, the nonparametric models estimated using equations (11)–(13) report a more successful
story. In this case, for all dependent variables and all models excepting Model (1), we cannot reject the
null of equality of distributions of actual and predicted data—what in Table 12 is referred to as “Actual
vs. predicted (nonparametric)”. Indeed, graphically (figures 3–6) we observe that only Model (1) performs
poorly in terms of predictive power, whereas model (12) usually performs much better. However, we also
notice that performance is worse for inflows, suggesting the behavior of both DBOin and DBIin is more
difficult to model. We should also acknowledge that the parametric models we are specifying are somewhat
naïve, since we could have stipulated a model with nonlinearities and so forth. However, our point is that,
since no established theory exists as to how the different covariates affect financial integration, applying
a nonparametric model may be more appropriate.
7. Conclusions
Over the last few years, the interest in the effect of financial globalization in general and banking global-
ization in particular has been spurred by the increase of cross-border asset holdings, especially in advanced
countries. In this paper, we provide some new findings on the drivers of international financial integra-
tion, focusing on the case of banking flows, from a different point of view. First, whereas the literature
on the determinants of financial integration is becoming voluminous, we think there is an issue largely
overlooked, namely, the precise definition of what international financial (and banking) integration is.
Second, the banking systems of the countries under study are sufficiently different in character that a
theory of financial integration tailored for some countries may not neatly fit others. The issue is especially
severe when such theories are lacking (Portes and Rey, 2005).
In our proposal, we consider financial integration and financial openness are not necessarily the same
thing. This is a key factor since either the existence or lack of consensus on what the drivers of financial
globalization are could be ascribed to the difficulties in properly measuring the extent of financial openness
and/or integration. We develop a new indicator of financial integration which considers it to be composed
not only of financial openness but also of financial connection. In addition, we define a Standard of
Perfect Banking Integration (given that we apply our methods to the context of banking integration).
This indicator could be regarded as the quantities counterpart to the law of one price, considered by the
literature which focuses on financial integration from a prices point of view. In the particular case of bank
flows we are dealing with, this may be very important because data on prices are usually either lacking or
poor. We deem it relevant to distinguish between financial inflows and financial outflows since results—as
it has been the case—might differ a great deal.
Regarding our set of explanatory variables, we have tried to be as parsimonious as possible and to
include most of the covariates identified by the growing literature on the drivers of financial globalization.
Although no formal theory exists as to what these drivers are, there is certain consensus in that geograph-
ical distance, trade, and financial development influence financial openness. Some other variables such as
social capital have been less extensively employed, but its impact on financial openness is not negligible
either. We have also considered that, in order to estimate accurately how the different covariates affect our
financial integration variables, it is worth including in the analysis some recent advances in nonparametric
econometrics, since some of the relationships to be modelled are rather involved.
Our findings supplement most of the previous stylized facts in several dimensions. In terms of the
indicators on financial openness and financial integration, we learn that depending on the direction of
financial flows (outflows or inflows), the assessment on the financial openness and integration of each
country might vary a great deal. This is especially the case of the US and Switzerland. Over time,
although financial integration increases, we are still far from the theoretical full potential (the Standard of
Perfect International Integration). In addition, countries advance in their “specialization”. In other words,
countries which are more open from the outflows perspective become more open from this perspective yet
not from the inflows.
In accordance with these findings, the influence of the independent variables varies depending on the
direction of the flows. Whereas the determinants of financial openness and financial integration from
the outflows perspective are in line with previous findings, results change from the inflows perspective.
However, many of these results can be explained away once we control for the behavior of some particular
countries in our sample. We have accomplished this by using nonparametric techniques, whose flexibility
makes it possible to uncover all features data might hide. It is also important to note that the specification
of nonparametric models is pertinent since, as shown by both the Hsiao et al. (2007) and Li (1999) tests,
the parametric models used so far by the literature misspecify the functional forms linking our set of
covariates to financial integration, especially when nonlinearities arise.
The future research agenda comprises two immediate goals. First, given the influence of extreme
observations, we should take into account some additional flexible techniques within the nonparametric
and semiparametric econometrics field. Second, because of the data requirements to construct our indices
of financial integration and the length of the sample, the analysis had to be restricted to eighteen countries
only. By shrinking the time span of the sample it could be possible to include some developing countries
in the analysis, which could provide some additional interesting results. As indicated earlier, because the
financial integration process in developing countries might be sufficiently different from that of developed
countries the same theory may not fit both cases.
Finally, we should also refer, perhaps as a third immediate goal in our research agenda, to the links
between our indicators of bank integration and the recent international financial crisis. It was not possible
to explore explicitly these links in the current version of the paper because of our sample period, which
ends before the bulk of the crisis took place. However, as more up-to-date information becomes available
that covers the years in which the crisis has hit most sample countries the hardest, it will be possible to
consider a set of testable hypotheses. Ideally, some of them should explore whether the countries whose
banking systems are more integrated are also those in which the financial crisis has been more severe.
However, the links might be involved, since we present a broader concept of banking integration which
considers both bank openness and bank connection, and the banking systems in each country also differ a
great deal. These remain as open and intriguing questions to be explored in immediate research initiatives.
Appendix A. Data description
• REMOTE – Remoteness: remoteness is defined following the definition by Nitsch (2000). Ac-
cording to this author, we can define the remoteness of a country i as the reciprocal of country j’s
GDP divided by the bilateral distance between country i and country j summed over all trading
partners of country i (in the sample):
Ri = (
∑
k
[Yj/Dij ])
−1 (14)
As found in other research studies, Belgium and the Netherlands, for year 2005, are the least remote
countries in the sample. On the other hand, Japan and the US are the most remote countries. The
advantage of this measure over considering distance alone is that we control for the fact that remote
countries—such as New Zealand and Australia—will trade more with each other than two countries
that are separated by the same absolute distance but are closer to other markets—such as Spain
and Sweden [Source: CHELEM].
• DTO – Degree of trade openness: we define trade openness in a similar fashion to the degree
of banking openness (DBO), yet considering trade flows instead of banking flows. Therefore, the
definition is:
DTOi =
∑
j∈N Xij
Ŷi
(15)
where DTOi is the degree of trade openness of country i, Xij are the exports (or imports) from
country i to country j, N is the sample size, Ŷi is the home bias-corrected GDP of country i, and
Xii = 0 [Source: CHELEM].
• DDTC – Degree of direct trade connection: we define trade connection similarly to banking
connection. Therefore, DDTC is defined following equation (2), where A = (αij) is the matrix of
relative trade flows (either exports or imports) in the real world, αij =
Xij∑
j∈N\i Xij
, B = (βij) is the
matrix of trade flows in the perfectly trade connected world, and βij = Yj/(
∑
k∈N\i Yk) [Source:
CHELEM].
• GDPPC – GDP per capita: logarithm of per capita GDP, in US dollars and adjusted with local
CPI [Source: CHELEM].
• MKTCAP – Market capitalization: market capitalization of listed companies, as percentage of
GDP [Source: World Development Indicators (WDI, World Bank)].
• DEPOSITS – Deposits: total bank deposits in each country, in US dollars, divided by GDP
[Source: European Central Bank, Swiss National Bank, Bank of Japan, Federal Reserve System].
• BANK50 – Banks among largest 50: number of banks in each country among the 50 largest
banks in the world, in terms of total assets [Source: BankScope].
• CPICH – Consumer price index change: consumer price index change [Source: International
Financial Statistics (IFS, International Monetary Fund)].
• FIN10 – Financial centers among largest 10: number of financial centers in each country
among the 10 largest world financial centers [Source: The Global Financial Centres Index, Z/Yen
Group].
• FIN1050 – Financial centers among largest 50, excluding 10 largest: number of financial
centers in each country among the 50 largest world financial centers, excluding the top 10 [Source:
The Global Financial Centres Index, Z/Yen Group].
• HERITAGE – Economic freedom: index of overall economic freedom constructed by the Her-
itage Foundation, defined as an unweighted average of 10 economic freedoms. These are busi-
ness freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, government size, monetary freedom, investment free-
dom, financial freedom, property rights, freedom from corruption, and labor freedom [Source:
Heritage Foundation].
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Table 1: Data by country (outflows), 1999 and 2005
Country
Total bank assetsa
Shares of the
international
banking mar-
kets
Total assets as
% of GDP
Total consoli-
dated foreign
claims as % of
GDP
Total consoli-
dated foreign
claims as % of
total assets
Total consoli-
dated foreign
claimsa
Total consoli-
dated foreign
claims of the
sample coun-
tries as % of
their total
foreign claims
Total consoli-
dated foreign
claims of the
sample coun-
tries as % of
total assets
1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005
Austria 488,939 850,800 1.38 1.54 229.43 263.86 47.61 97.14 20.75 34.95 67,261 139,299 66.30 46.85 13.76 16.37
Belgium 718,791 1,247,769 2.03 2.25 283.19 318.31 151.66 242.75 53.55 72.14 318,891 759,217 82.84 84.34 44.36 60.85
Canada 1,120,339 1,994,859 3.17 3.60 172.04 159.40 44.85 41.97 26.07 23.43 250,845 395,502 85.89 84.61 22.39 19.83
Denmark 356,402 668,469 1.01 1.21 204.89 242.87 28.75 57.85 14.03 22.39 32,263 112,474 64.52 75.15 9.05 16.83
Finland 120,251 291,268 0.34 0.53 93.31 139.07 24.27 37.85 26.01 25.10 24,845 53,309 79.45 72.92 20.66 18.30
France 3,643,785 6,455,200 10.30 11.66 250.28 289.38 57.66 83.64 23.04 27.55 662,008 1,450,788 78.86 81.57 18.17 22.47
Germany 5,704,621 8,092,034 16.13 14.61 266.12 278.39 80.59 100.01 30.28 34.54 1,333,868 2,255,130 77.21 80.68 23.38 27.87
Greece 181,933 337,394 0.51 0.61 148.27 137.74 NA 16.95 NA 11.32 NA 18,425 NA 48.26 NA 5.46
Ireland 304,193 1,362,671 0.86 2.46 315.10 612.02 77.97 246.16 24.74 36.46 69,435 437,845 92.25 88.13 22.83 32.13
Italy 1,649,453 3,066,158 4.66 5.54 137.36 166.21 21.53 20.48 15.67 11.77 198,396 233,485 76.74 64.69 12.03 7.61
Japan 7,517,125 6,340,539 21.25 11.45 172.90 146.09 23.62 36.46 13.66 26.07 762,596 1,196,335 74.27 72.38 10.14 18.87
Netherlands 988,225 1,999,945 2.79 3.61 237.78 304.13 97.29 265.95 40.91 83.01 312,146 1,499,115 77.20 90.30 31.59 74.96
Portugal 250,547 426,226 0.71 0.77 205.94 221.33 37.12 49.71 18.03 21.38 30,082 64,201 66.60 70.46 12.01 15.06
Spain 1,048,501 2,600,531 2.96 4.70 169.68 212.46 41.30 75.74 24.34 32.75 194,915 783,021 76.37 91.93 18.59 30.11
Sweden 477,890 854,200 1.35 1.54 188.35 221.91 35.70 141.13 18.95 59.10 69,596 384,685 76.84 76.20 14.56 45.03
Switzerland 1,402,756 2,165,757 3.97 3.91 529.59 570.30 363.78 526.25 68.69 89.18 886,789 1,682,795 92.03 87.12 63.22 77.70
United Kingdom 3,802,069 7,870,559 10.75 14.21 259.55 335.63 59.14 111.81 22.78 31.28 565,207 1,804,436 65.25 73.30 14.87 22.93
United States 5,596,500 8,753,600 15.82 15.81 60.72 66.31 7.36 8.29 12.12 11.75 468,448 708,844 69.04 68.90 8.37 8.10
a In millions of current $US.
Table 2: DBO, DDBC and DBI, 1999 and 2005 (%)
Country
DBOi DDBCi DBIi
Outflows Inflows Outflows Inflows Outflows Inflows
1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005
Austria 13.77 16.50 16.90 18.00 80.98 83.81 66.93 66.97 33.39 37.18 33.63 34.72
Belgium 45.47 63.02 25.38 29.45 67.07 77.84 74.76 73.07 55.22 70.04 43.56 46.39
Canada 22.66 20.71 11.48 11.94 55.92 59.15 93.36 88.07 35.60 35.00 32.74 32.43
Denmark 9.24 17.24 15.02 36.29 58.67 55.21 74.78 32.26 23.28 30.85 33.52 34.22
Finland 20.42 18.37 30.29 42.40 53.89 36.20 60.17 23.49 33.17 25.79 42.69 31.56
France 21.62 27.78 11.83 14.66 90.50 91.21 82.69 85.97 44.24 50.33 31.28 35.50
Germany 32.03 37.25 11.45 17.50 86.86 88.72 85.57 80.68 52.75 57.49 31.30 37.57
Greece 0.00 5.30 24.33 42.14 NA 75.91 83.07 62.46 NA 20.05 44.96 51.31
Ireland 23.10 33.77 35.15 33.48 55.01 77.52 76.05 81.54 35.65 51.17 51.70 52.25
Italy 12.20 8.37 24.98 24.86 78.05 89.49 75.15 80.58 30.86 27.37 43.33 44.76
Japan 15.29 22.88 8.20 10.12 73.82 72.18 87.65 79.56 33.60 40.64 26.80 28.37
Netherlands 29.05 75.57 28.36 32.91 84.46 86.92 68.20 70.26 49.53 81.05 43.98 48.08
Portugal 11.54 14.52 20.38 34.60 70.09 76.47 64.03 59.04 28.44 33.32 36.12 45.20
Spain 14.00 25.24 15.07 22.24 76.41 70.26 77.73 80.68 32.70 42.11 34.23 42.36
Sweden 14.76 46.06 16.60 18.13 61.33 47.82 76.69 57.93 30.09 46.93 35.68 32.41
Switzerland 66.86 81.94 7.98 8.00 72.04 68.54 79.06 86.86 69.41 74.94 25.11 26.36
United Kingdom 17.01 28.64 37.06 42.30 75.16 70.26 77.74 82.15 35.75 44.85 53.67 58.95
United States 9.23 8.94 47.10 72.52 83.33 90.06 90.01 84.59 27.74 28.38 65.11 78.32
Unweighted mean 21.01 30.67 21.53 28.42 71.98 73.20 77.42 70.90 38.32 44.31 39.41 42.26
Standard deviation 0.15 0.22 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.18 0.12 0.17 0.10 0.13
Coefficient of variation 0.73 0.73 0.51 0.56 0.16 0.21 0.11 0.26 0.31 0.39 0.26 0.30
Table 3: Global degrees (DGBO, DDGBC, DGBI), 1999–2005 (%)
Year
DGBO DGDBC DGBI
Outflows Inflows Outflows Inflows Outflows Inflows
1999 20.85 21.13 78.23 83.32 38.95 39.58
2000 23.22 23.84 80.44 85.63 41.69 42.57
2001 24.84 25.79 81.50 84.34 42.86 43.88
2002 25.18 26.41 81.03 81.42 42.72 43.87
2003 24.99 25.81 80.17 81.45 42.43 43.36
2004 27.71 28.65 78.41 80.40 44.37 45.41
2005 28.78 30.48 79.88 80.25 45.41 46.64
Table 4: The drivers of DBO, outflows, 1999–2005
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
(Intercept) 0.319∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.013 −2.305∗∗∗ −1.496∗∗∗ −2.106∗∗∗ −1.951∗∗∗ −0.793 0.023 −0.868∗ −0.889∗ −0.894∗
(0.025) (0.042) (0.063) (0.475) (0.444) (0.446) (0.488) (0.509) (0.495) (0.480) (0.478) (0.521)
REMOTE −1.155∗∗∗ −0.202 −0.450 −1.026∗∗∗ −0.591∗ −0.561∗ −0.729∗∗ −1.057∗∗∗ −0.869∗∗∗ −1.442∗∗∗ −1.439∗∗∗ −1.438∗∗∗
(0.333) (0.331) (0.355) (0.346) (0.316) (0.298) (0.367) (0.344) (0.317) (0.308) (0.306) (0.307)
DTO 0.562∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.092) (0.088) (0.080) (0.078) (0.079) (0.073) (0.071) (0.070) (0.075) (0.079)
DDTC 0.186∗ −0.009 −0.059 −0.156∗ −0.142 −0.158∗ −0.136∗ 0.035 0.044 0.045
(0.102) (0.102) (0.091) (0.089) (0.090) (0.083) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.083)
GDPPC 0.250∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.095∗ 0.013 0.100∗∗ 0.123∗∗ 0.124∗∗
(0.051) (0.048) (0.048) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.049) (0.051) (0.053)
MKTCAP 0.125∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
DEPOSITS 0.087∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019)
BANK50 0.003 0.006∗ −0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
CPICH −0.052∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
FIN10 0.133∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.028) (0.030) (0.031)
FIN1050 −0.063∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
HERITAGE −0.352 −0.351
(0.228) (0.235)
EURO 0.001
(0.032)
R2 0.088 0.303 0.322 0.435 0.558 0.611 0.613 0.676 0.731 0.782 0.786 0.786
R¯2 0.081 0.292 0.305 0.416 0.540 0.591 0.590 0.654 0.710 0.763 0.766 0.764
F 12.0 26.7 19.3 23.2 30.3 31.1 26.7 30.5 35.1 41.2 38.1 34.6
p 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log-likelihood 34.7 51.6 53.3 64.8 80.4 88.3 88.6 99.9 111.7 124.8 126.1 126.1
N 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table 5: The drivers of DBO, inflows, 1999–2005
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
(Intercept) 0.230∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.035 0.182 −0.065 0.550 −0.765∗ −0.851∗ −0.002 0.043 −0.164
(0.017) (0.033) (0.048) (0.393) (0.413) (0.436) (0.458) (0.456) (0.486) (0.475) (0.453) (0.491)
REMOTE 0.321 0.265 0.635∗∗ 0.551∗ 0.630∗∗ 0.642∗∗ −0.023 0.350 0.330 0.877∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗∗
(0.229) (0.260) (0.269) (0.286) (0.294) (0.292) (0.345) (0.308) (0.311) (0.304) (0.290) (0.290)
DTO −0.033 0.007 −0.012 0.002 −0.029 0.008 −0.049 −0.061 0.077 −0.015 −0.039
(0.072) (0.069) (0.073) (0.074) (0.076) (0.074) (0.065) (0.070) (0.069) (0.071) (0.074)
DDTC −0.278∗∗∗ −0.306∗∗∗ −0.315∗∗∗ −0.354∗∗∗ −0.302∗∗∗ −0.285∗∗∗ −0.287∗∗∗ −0.450∗∗∗ −0.469∗∗∗ −0.436∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.084) (0.084) (0.087) (0.085) (0.074) (0.075) (0.076) (0.072) (0.078)
GDPPC 0.037 0.019 0.044 −0.020 0.099∗∗ 0.107∗∗ 0.024 −0.026 −0.012
(0.042) (0.045) (0.047) (0.049) (0.047) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) (0.050)
MKTCAP 0.023 0.023 0.019 0.019 0.025 0.003 0.004 0.006
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
DEPOSITS 0.035 0.024 0.025 0.028 0.017 0.015 0.008
(0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
BANK50 0.011∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.008∗∗ −0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
CPICH 0.059∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
FIN10 −0.014 0.048∗ 0.007 0.012
(0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029)
FIN1050 0.060∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
HERITAGE 0.762∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗
(0.216) (0.222)
EURO 0.033
(0.030)
R2 0.016 0.017 0.112 0.117 0.126 0.146 0.219 0.406 0.407 0.512 0.560 0.565
R¯2 0.008 0.001 0.090 0.088 0.090 0.103 0.173 0.365 0.361 0.470 0.518 0.518
F 2.0 1.1 5.1 4.0 3.5 3.4 4.7 10.0 8.9 12.1 13.2 12.2
p 0.163 0.341 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log-likelihood 82.0 82.1 88.5 88.9 89.5 91.0 96.6 113.8 114.0 126.2 132.7 133.4
N 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table 6: The drivers of DBI, outflows, 1999–2005
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
(Intercept) 0.481∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ −1.521∗∗∗ −0.828∗ −1.496∗∗∗ −1.204∗∗ −0.247 0.330 −0.407 −0.437 −0.547
(0.022) (0.038) (0.058) (0.450) (0.443) (0.435) (0.464) (0.484) (0.484) (0.470) (0.457) (0.498)
REMOTE −0.901∗∗∗ −0.129 −0.317 −0.740∗∗ −0.398 −0.373 −0.714∗∗ −1.006∗∗∗ −0.874∗∗∗ −1.355∗∗∗ −1.344∗∗∗ −1.340∗∗∗
(0.287) (0.291) (0.312) (0.314) (0.300) (0.278) (0.340) (0.323) (0.308) (0.300) (0.292) (0.293)
DTO 0.464∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.083) (0.081) (0.076) (0.072) (0.073) (0.068) (0.069) (0.070) (0.072) (0.076)
DDTC 0.146 0.014 −0.025 −0.126 −0.099 −0.109 −0.093 0.059 0.075 0.093
(0.091) (0.092) (0.086) (0.082) (0.083) (0.077) (0.073) (0.075) (0.073) (0.079)
GDPPC 0.187∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.056 −0.001 0.071 0.110∗∗ 0.117∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.046) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.049) (0.051)
MKTCAP 0.095∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
DEPOSITS 0.091∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
BANK50 0.006∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.001 0.009∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
CPICH −0.044∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗ −0.020∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
FIN10 0.098∗∗∗ 0.037 0.068∗∗ 0.071∗∗
(0.026) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029)
FIN1050 −0.058∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
HERITAGE −0.597∗∗∗ −0.568∗∗
(0.220) (0.227)
EURO 0.018
(0.031)
R2 0.076 0.269 0.284 0.367 0.463 0.545 0.556 0.620 0.662 0.718 0.736 0.737
R¯2 0.068 0.256 0.266 0.346 0.440 0.521 0.529 0.593 0.634 0.693 0.710 0.708
F 9.8 21.9 15.6 17.0 20.0 22.9 20.4 23.0 24.3 28.3 27.9 25.4
p 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log-likelihood 51.7 66.0 67.4 74.9 84.9 94.9 96.5 105.9 113.0 124.3 128.2 128.4
N 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table 7: The drivers of DBI, inflows, 1999–2005
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
(Intercept) 0.415∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ 0.579 0.727∗ 0.441 1.123∗∗∗ −0.201 −0.329 0.418 0.443 0.210
(0.015) (0.029) (0.043) (0.355) (0.372) (0.391) (0.400) (0.377) (0.401) (0.385) (0.378) (0.409)
REMOTE 0.249 0.221 0.495∗∗ 0.510∗ 0.589∗∗ 0.603∗∗ −0.134 0.242 0.212 0.693∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗
(0.203) (0.230) (0.242) (0.258) (0.265) (0.261) (0.301) (0.255) (0.257) (0.247) (0.242) (0.241)
DTO −0.016 0.014 0.017 0.032 −0.004 0.037 −0.021 −0.039 0.083 0.032 0.006
(0.064) (0.063) (0.066) (0.067) (0.068) (0.064) (0.054) (0.057) (0.056) (0.059) (0.062)
DDTC −0.205∗∗∗ −0.200∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗ −0.254∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗∗ −0.326∗∗∗ −0.336∗∗∗ −0.298∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.076) (0.076) (0.078) (0.074) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.060) (0.065)
GDPPC −0.007 −0.024 0.004 −0.066 0.053 0.066 −0.007 −0.034 −0.019
(0.038) (0.040) (0.042) (0.043) (0.039) (0.041) (0.039) (0.040) (0.042)
MKTCAP 0.023 0.024 0.019 0.019 0.028 0.008 0.009 0.011
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
DEPOSITS 0.041∗∗ 0.029 0.029∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.024∗ 0.023 0.015
(0.019) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
BANK50 0.012∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.002 0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
CPICH 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
FIN10 −0.021 0.034 0.011 0.017
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024)
FIN1050 0.053∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
HERITAGE 0.414∗∗ 0.474∗∗
(0.181) (0.184)
EURO 0.037
(0.025)
R2 0.012 0.012 0.078 0.078 0.090 0.124 0.238 0.481 0.485 0.589 0.607 0.614
R¯2 0.004 −0.004 0.055 0.048 0.053 0.080 0.193 0.446 0.445 0.553 0.569 0.573
F 1.5 0.8 3.4 2.6 2.4 2.8 5.3 13.6 12.1 16.5 16.0 15.0
p 0.222 0.461 0.019 0.041 0.042 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log-likelihood 97.3 97.3 101.7 101.7 102.5 104.9 113.7 137.9 138.4 152.6 155.4 156.6
N 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table 8: Nonparametric estimates of the distribution of DBIout determinants, 1999–2005
REMOTE DO DDC GDPPC MKTCAP DEPOSITS BANK50 CPICH FIN10 FIN1050 HERITAGE EURO
Mean −5.85E − 02 3.48E − 03 −1.32E − 16 1.63E − 01 4.99E − 03 −7.95E − 03 4.30E − 18 −7.57E − 17 6.39E − 187 −2.62E − 04 −8.13E − 03 2.03E − 03
(s.e.) (3.35E − 01) (8.12E − 03) (2.35E − 09) (8.44E − 02) (5.71E − 03) (7.51E − 03) (9.29E − 11) (1.65E − 09) (5.01E − 02) (1.35E − 03) (5.62E − 02) (0.00E + 00)
10% −5.88E − 01 −3.49E − 04 −3.95E − 16 −1.85E − 01 −8.45E − 03 −2.93E − 02 −1.64E − 17 −3.74E − 15 −9.72E − 190 −3.58E − 04 −1.06E − 01 −2.03E − 06
(s.e.) (9.33E − 02) (2.26E − 03) (6.53E − 10) (2.35E − 02) (1.59E − 03) (2.09E − 03) (2.58E − 11) (4.60E − 10) (1.39E − 02) (3.76E − 04) (1.56E − 02) (0.00E + 00)
20% −3.25E − 01 −4.73E − 05 −1.35E − 16 −6.24E − 02 −1.72E − 03 −1.70E − 02 −9.49E − 19 −1.82E − 15 −6.60E − 224 −1.54E − 07 −5.63E − 02 −5.55E − 17
(s.e.) (1.30E − 01) (3.16E − 03) (9.14E − 10) (3.29E − 02) (2.22E − 03) (2.92E − 03) (3.61E − 11) (6.43E − 10) (1.95E − 02) (5.26E − 04) (2.19E − 02) (0.00E + 00)
30% −2.12E − 01 1.34E − 04 −4.88E − 17 −1.75E − 03 −5.17E − 04 −1.02E − 02 1.67E − 67 −8.48E − 16 −6.58E − 239 −3.10E − 10 −4.00E − 02 0.00E + 00
(s.e.) (1.66E − 01) (4.02E − 03) (1.16E − 09) (4.18E − 02) (2.83E − 03) (3.72E − 03) (4.60E − 11) (8.18E − 10) (2.48E − 02) (6.68E − 04) (2.78E − 02) (0.00E + 00)
40% −1.25E − 01 3.68E − 04 −1.93E − 17 3.44E − 02 3.61E − 04 −5.24E − 03 7.52E − 33 −3.99E − 16 1.55E − 283 −5.85E − 13 −1.82E − 02 0.00E + 00
(s.e.) (2.04E − 01) (4.94E − 03) (1.43E − 09) (5.14E − 02) (3.48E − 03) (4.57E − 03) (5.66E − 11) (1.01E − 09) (3.05E − 02) (8.23E − 04) (3.42E − 02) (0.00E + 00)
50% −4.27E − 02 6.31E − 04 −1.62E − 18 1.08E − 01 1.75E − 03 −2.76E − 03 6.62E − 24 6.39E − 17 2.91E − 224 −2.63E − 113 −5.30E − 03 0.00E + 00
(s.e.) (2.62E − 01) (6.35E − 03) (1.84E − 09) (6.60E − 02) (4.47E − 03) (5.87E − 03) (7.26E − 11) (1.29E − 09) (3.92E − 02) (1.06E − 03) (4.39E − 02) (0.00E + 00)
60% 8.46E − 03 1.13E − 03 2.34E − 17 1.85E − 01 4.25E − 03 −7.38E − 04 1.41E − 19 7.39E − 16 6.07E − 204 −2.49E − 227 2.04E − 03 5.55E − 17
(s.e.) (3.30E − 01) (8.00E − 03) (2.31E − 09) (8.32E − 02) (5.63E − 03) (7.40E − 03) (9.15E − 11) (1.63E − 09) (4.94E − 02) (1.33E − 03) (5.54E − 02) (0.00E + 00)
70% 7.10E − 02 2.35E − 03 4.59E − 17 2.86E − 01 6.69E − 03 1.02E − 04 2.93E − 18 1.52E − 15 3.63E − 191 6.34E − 25 1.97E − 02 1.11E − 16
(s.e.) (3.81E − 01) (9.22E − 03) (2.66E − 09) (9.58E − 02) (6.49E − 03) (8.53E − 03) (1.05E − 10) (1.88E − 09) (5.69E − 02) (1.53E − 03) (6.38E − 02) (0.00E + 00)
80% 1.83E − 01 5.30E − 03 9.34E − 17 4.23E − 01 1.15E − 02 1.52E − 03 9.47E − 18 3.15E − 15 1.98E − 189 8.82E − 10 4.12E − 02 1.46E − 08
(s.e.) (4.86E − 01) (1.18E − 02) (3.40E − 09) (1.22E − 01) (8.28E − 03) (1.09E − 02) (1.35E − 10) (2.39E − 09) (7.26E − 02) (1.96E − 03) (8.14E − 02) (0.00E + 00)
90% 3.88E − 01 1.23E − 02 2.17E − 16 6.13E − 01 2.58E − 02 7.85E − 03 3.43E − 17 7.10E − 15 5.57E − 187 5.65E − 06 9.49E − 02 6.89E − 05
(s.e.) (6.66E − 01) (1.61E − 02) (4.66E − 09) (1.68E − 01) (1.14E − 02) (1.49E − 02) (1.84E − 10) (3.28E − 09) (9.96E − 02) (2.68E − 03) (1.12E − 01) (0.00E + 00)
Table 9: Nonparametric estimates of the distribution of DBIin determinants, 1999–2005
REMOTE DO DDC GDPPC MKTCAP DEPOSITS BANK50 CPICH FIN10 FIN1050 HERITAGE EURO
Mean −2.14E − 02 4.40E − 03 −2.97E − 03 1.41E − 01 1.51E − 04 1.19E − 17 −4.38E − 05 3.01E − 17 6.46E − 04 −8.13E − 18 6.91E − 03 8.47E − 04
(s.e.) (3.01E − 01) (1.42E − 02) (6.12E − 03) (6.32E − 02) (1.13E − 03) (2.53E − 10) (3.25E − 04) (2.59E − 10) (2.29E − 03) (2.00E − 10) (2.48E − 02) (0.00E + 00)
10% −7.00E − 01 −9.71E − 03 −1.28E − 02 −1.87E − 01 −8.40E − 04 −3.06E − 17 −4.44E − 04 −1.75E − 16 −6.58E − 05 −1.99E − 17 −5.06E − 02 −1.39E − 16
(s.e.) (1.12E − 01) (5.27E − 03) (2.28E − 03) (2.35E − 02) (4.22E − 04) (9.41E − 11) (1.21E − 04) (9.62E − 11) (8.51E − 04) (7.43E − 11) (9.24E − 03) (0.00E + 00)
20% −3.17E − 01 −4.99E − 03 −3.67E − 03 −5.26E − 02 −3.59E − 04 −2.14E − 17 −1.89E − 04 −7.51E − 17 −9.57E − 07 −1.16E − 17 −2.54E − 02 −5.55E − 17
(s.e.) (1.50E − 01) (7.07E − 03) (3.05E − 03) (3.16E − 02) (5.66E − 04) (1.26E − 10) (1.62E − 04) (1.29E − 10) (1.14E − 03) (9.96E − 11) (1.24E − 02) (0.00E + 00)
30% −2.17E − 01 −9.57E − 04 −1.79E − 03 6.87E − 03 −1.26E − 04 −9.65E − 18 −6.08E − 05 −3.37E − 17 −5.52E − 12 −3.10E − 18 −1.10E − 02 0.00E + 00
(s.e.) (1.89E − 01) (8.90E − 03) (3.84E − 03) (3.97E − 02) (7.13E − 04) (1.59E − 10) (2.04E − 04) (1.62E − 10) (1.44E − 03) (1.25E − 10) (1.56E − 02) (0.00E + 00)
40% −9.69E − 02 8.60E − 04 −9.69E − 04 9.12E − 02 −4.09E − 05 −4.15E − 18 −3.49E − 06 7.92E − 18 −3.50E − 25 −2.80E − 20 −4.02E − 03 0.00E + 00
(s.e.) (2.36E − 01) (1.11E − 02) (4.80E − 03) (4.95E − 02) (8.89E − 04) (1.98E − 10) (2.55E − 04) (2.03E − 10) (1.79E − 03) (1.56E − 10) (1.94E − 02) (0.00E + 00)
50% 2.66E − 04 3.29E − 03 −4.08E − 04 1.42E − 01 1.35E − 05 9.29E − 20 −1.05E − 07 2.41E − 17 −1.85E − 168 −6.48E − 23 4.21E − 03 0.00E + 00
(s.e.) (2.73E − 01) (1.29E − 02) (5.56E − 03) (5.75E − 02) (1.03E − 03) (2.30E − 10) (2.96E − 04) (2.35E − 10) (2.08E − 03) (1.82E − 10) (2.26E − 02) (0.00E + 00)
60% 1.30E − 01 6.26E − 03 7.57E − 05 1.82E − 01 1.17E − 04 5.45E − 18 −3.50E − 34 5.71E − 17 5.33E − 68 6.19E − 81 1.04E − 02 5.55E − 17
(s.e.) (3.05E − 01) (1.44E − 02) (6.21E − 03) (6.41E − 02) (1.15E − 03) (2.57E − 10) (3.30E − 04) (2.62E − 10) (2.32E − 03) (2.02E − 10) (2.52E − 02) (0.00E + 00)
70% 2.86E − 01 9.04E − 03 4.86E − 04 2.52E − 01 2.41E − 04 1.21E − 17 5.51E − 12 8.92E − 17 3.58E − 12 1.14E − 26 2.22E − 02 1.04E − 10
(s.e.) (3.65E − 01) (1.72E − 02) (7.43E − 03) (7.68E − 02) (1.38E − 03) (3.07E − 10) (3.95E − 04) (3.14E − 10 (2.78E − 03) (2.42E − 10) (3.01E − 02) (0.00E + 00)
80% 4.75E − 01 1.44E − 02 8.13E − 04 3.59E − 01 6.58E − 04 4.07E − 17 4.38E − 05 1.36E − 16 7.30E − 06 7.93E − 21 4.20E − 02 2.54E − 06
(s.e.) (4.14E − 01) (1.95E − 02) (8.43E − 03) (8.71E − 02) (1.56E − 03) (3.49E − 10) (4.48E − 04) (3.56E − 10) (3.15E − 03) (2.75E − 10) (3.42E − 02) (0.00E + 00)
90% 6.75E − 01 2.65E − 02 1.47E − 03 4.99E − 01 1.45E − 03 7.75E − 17 3.24E − 04 2.12E − 16 1.40E − 04 8.10E − 19 6.13E − 02 6.83E − 04
(s.e.) (5.03E − 01) (2.37E − 02) (1.02E − 02) (1.06E − 01) (1.90E − 03) (4.23E − 10) (5.44E − 04) (4.33E − 10) (3.83E − 03) (3.34E − 10) (4.15E − 02) (0.00E + 00)
Table 10: Nonparametric regression, bandwidths (Racine, 1997; Racine et al., 2006)
Variable DBOout DBOin DBIout DBIin
REMOTE 0.002 ∞ 0.005 0.004
DO ∞ 0.014 0.211 0.089
DDC ∞ 0.018 ∞ 0.205
GDPPC 0.018 0.026 0.020 0.020
MKTCAP 0.346 0.269 0.299 1.107
DEPOSITS 0.095 0.278 0.228 ∞
BANK50 3.339 2.312 ∞ 3.86
CPICH 0.512 ∞ ∞ ∞
FIN10 0.029 14.970 0.034 0.549
FIN1050 0.795 0.081 1.266 ∞
HERITAGE 0.024 ∞ 0.030 0.051
EURO 0.490 0.000 0.163 0.251
Table 11: Appropriateness of the parametric specification (Hsiao et al., 2007)
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) Model (11) Model (12)
DBOout J-statistic 6.957 2.387 5.594 3.923 6.236 2.650 4.905 3.847 4.247 3.915 2.309 2.370
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DBOin J-statistic 5.986 5.934 5.541 5.343 3.782 2.839 5.114 5.106 4.778 5.510 4.983 5.240
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DBIout J-statistic 7.783 2.733 6.921 3.821 4.388 3.821 5.439 3.158 4.917 3.563 2.310 3.929
p-value 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DBIin J-statistic 7.278 7.186 5.951 5.820 5.566 5.723 5.283 6.227 6.405 6.268 6.202 6.475
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: p-values obtained using 399 bootstrap repetitions.
Table 12: Parametric vs. nonparametric models (Li, 1999)
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) Model (11) Model (12)
DBOout Actual vs. predicted (nonparametric) T -statistic 8.680 1.811 1.939 1.794 –0.006 0.024 1.100 0.617 0.909 1.415 0.509 0.434
p-value 0.000 0.038 0.035 0.070 0.383 0.370 0.095 0.198 0.130 0.085 0.223 0.263
Actual vs. predicted (parametric): T -statistic 37.503 14.583 9.043 15.701 5.583 4.157 4.579 7.137 5.017 3.472 1.994 1.993
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.038 0.030
Predicted (parametric) vs. predicted (nonparametric): T -statistic 32.200 12.183 11.442 16.683 6.037 4.425 5.015 7.606 5.098 3.863 2.450 2.430
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.033 0.025
DBOin Actual vs. predicted (nonparametric) T -statistic 13.330 2.700 0.969 1.069 1.069 1.070 0.804 1.111 1.103 1.101 1.153 1.314
p-value 0.000 0.018 0.163 0.110 0.158 0.140 0.175 0.128 0.090 0.110 0.118 0.118
Actual vs. predicted (parametric): T -statistic 42.672 37.674 17.480 16.012 16.563 15.255 13.356 8.473 8.410 6.649 7.388 7.313
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Predicted (parametric) vs. predicted (nonparametric): T -statistic 34.121 37.322 15.629 15.872 15.912 13.367 12.879 7.935 8.205 5.638 7.919 7.778
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DBIout Actual vs. predicted (nonparametric) T -statistic 10.024 2.533 2.334 0.901 –0.548 0.422 –0.059 –0.317 –0.173 0.782 –0.262 1.347
p-value 0.000 0.018 0.035 0.135 0.650 0.290 0.460 0.545 0.495 0.173 0.548 0.875
Actual vs. predicted (parametric): T -statistic 37.700 15.605 14.459 11.446 5.156 3.667 2.787 3.910 2.285 1.936 1.222 0.961
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.035 0.048 0.103 0.145
Predicted (parametric) vs. predicted (nonparametric): T -statistic 34.600 15.826 18.160 12.427 5.279 3.841 2.913 4.173 2.670 2.551 1.472 1.444
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.015 0.003 0.023 0.033 0.090 0.070
DBIin Actual vs. predicted (nonparametric) T -statistic 9.156 0.494 –0.133 –0.123 0.013 –0.325 –0.121 –0.076 0.128 –0.005 –0.093 0.000
p-value 0.000 0.250 0.438 0.475 0.395 0.533 0.465 0.420 0.320 0.425 0.478 0.418
Actual vs. predicted (parametric): T -statistic 42.813 42.074 17.114 17.230 19.085 14.719 9.880 4.927 4.408 2.602 4.048 4.232
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.395 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.013 0.005
Predicted (parametric) vs. predicted (nonparametric): T -statistic 26.320 38.263 16.115 16.683 17.995 14.022 8.983 4.097 3.450 2.292 3.296 3.361
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.015 0.028 0.005 0.018
Note: p-values obtained using 399 bootstrap repetitions.
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